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Ift.RODUCTION 
The purpose ot this thesis is, as indicated by the title, 
to investigate the system ot philosophy and morality delineated 
by Lucius Annaeus Seneca the Younger. The volumes ot Senecan 
composition are numerous and varied in theme, but throughout 
there pervades a philosophical influence entirely new to Rome. 
Other teachers adhering to their particular schools ot thought, 
had brought torth many ot the tenets held by Seneca. It is here 
that the individuality ot the man exhibits itself in that his 
was a system composed ot the elements ot many schools. This 
investigation purposes to analyze Senecan teaching both in its 
origin and in its content, in its theory and in practice. 
Truth, objective truth, is the same for the pagan as it is 
tor the Christian. Blinded though he might have been by the 
grossness of error, let us give the pagan credit tor his efforts 
to arrive at the eternal verities. We who possess the inestima-
ble light ot grace, the heritage of well defined and accurately 
stated philosophical teaching, the books ot Divine Revelation 
and the supernatural guidance of an infallible authority, too 
often take· it for gran-ted that the same position obtained for 
pagan thinkers of the past. The actual case is far otherwise. 
"Flying blind,u to use a current aeronautical term, they had no 
guide other than the light ot reason, often grossly perverted 
either by personal misconduct on the one hand or on the other by 
the materialistic environment in which they lived. But they too, 
2 
many of them, aspired to a more rational existence, and in saner 
moments sought to discover and formulate standards of life which 
would ultimately lead to a reasonable goal. Seneca may be cred-
ited with such aspirations, laboring the while in the darkness 
of paganism. 
In the endeavor to formulate from his writings a set group 
of principles which may be styled the "Senecan System of Moral-
ity," we must define his position on the existence and nature ot 
God, the human soul, the purpose ot life, man's attitude towards 
death, life hereafter and immortality. These topics contain the 
mass of Senecan philosophy. They will be studied in the order 
indicated. A code of morality summarized from the multifarious 
works of a man whose very ideas were themselves a compilation of 
the thoughts of other masters, will of its very nature admit of 
many discrepancies. Thus, from the tangled mass of inconsisten-
cies, not to say pure guess-work and actual contradictions 
appearing in the various works of Seneca, it will be our endeavor 
to evolve some tangible system of thought which might be said to 
be Senecan Morality, Senecan Philosophy. 
Statements of Seneca to which reference is made will be 
taken from the Dialogi, the Epistulae ~ Lucilium and the 
Naturales Quaestiones.1 Only brief mention will be made of the 
1. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Opera Omnia, (Teubner Edition, 
1898). 
Tragoediae, and this tor several reasons. or these it is suffi-
cient to mention the most important. While the plays abound in 
moral and philosophical observations, these latter are based on 
2 
mythological references, and in the words ot Seneca himself 
they should bear no weight in so important a discussion. 
2. ~· xxiv, 18. 
Jte.. lxxxii, 16. 
Ad Marciam ~ Consolatione, xix, 4. 
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CHAPI.'ER I 
SENECA: EDUCATION AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born in Corduba (the present 
cordova), Spain about the year 4 B.C., but was brought to Rome 
in early life. His first teachers of note were Sotion, the 
Pythagorean of Alexandria, and Fabianus Papirius. Of the latter 
he wrote in later life, "Fabianus, ~!!his cathedrariis 
philosophis, sed ~ veris et antiquis" ,3 indicating his rever-
ence for this master. By the time he was twenty-five, Seneca 
was a thorough-going follower of Pythagoras. For it was in 
19 A.D. that his father made the lad give up his newly acquired 
habit of abstinence from flesh meat.4 This latter was a prac-
tice advocated by the Pythagoreans. As he himself says, Seneca 
thought nobly of this school for a time. He writes, ".!!2.!! pudebit 
fateri quem mihi amorem Pythagoras inieceritff.5 
From the Pythagoreans, Sotion and Fabianus Papirius, the 
young student passed to the lecture room of Attalus the Stoic, 
which latter teacher had a more decided influence on his char-
J. ~ Brevitate Vitae, x, 1. 
4. ~· cviii, 22. 
Ibid., cviii, 17. 
~· lxiii, 15. 
Quaestiones Naturales, viii, 32, 2. 
5. ~· cviii, 17. 
5 
6 acter. The elder Seneca described this new pedagogue as the 
~ost eloquent and by tar the most acute philosopher of his time, 
nmagnae vir eloquentiae !! philosophis, quos nostra aetas vidit, 
1onge et subtilissimus ..!! faoundissimus" .7 Long years later as 
an old man, Seneca spoke with reverence and affection of his 
master in the school of Stoicism.s 
Quintilian tells us that the Roman character was tor tak-
ing up the thoughts developed by the Greeks, and putting them 
into practice. And, as a true Roman, he adds that this is the 
~more important phase of living, "Quantum enim Graeci praeceptis 
~alent, tantum Romani (quod·!!! maius) exemplis".9 Seneca, 
earnest in his quest tor the "summum bonum", practiced literally 
the dicta of his new-found school. He undertook such gross 
imprudences as cold baths in winter, and by reason of his already 
weakened condition contracted tuberculosis. The thought of his 
pld father was the only restraining force which deterred him from 
suicide. 
Thoroughly versed in the systems of Pythagoras and the 
6. Francis Holland, Seneca, (London: Longmans, Green 
and Company, 1920). p. 15. 
7. Suasoriae, ii. 
8. !2· lxvii, 15. 
h• ix, 7. 
!lt• lxiii, 5. 
~. lxxxi, 22. 
~· cviii, 13. 
!P.· ex, 14. 
9. Institutiones Oratoriae, rli, 2. 
6 
stoics, Seneca also read widely of the works of Epicurus. 
Though he never adopted the practices taught by the Cynics, 
he often speaks favorably ot the arch-cynic Diogenes,10 and 
again and again refers to the Cynic Demetrius as a man worthy ot 
the highest esteem.ll 
The lite of Seneca was one of singularly dramatic contrasts 
and vicissitudes.12 He began his public lite in the year 32 
A.D. under Claudius. Banished in 41 A.D. to the island ot Cor-
sica, Seneca used his time of exile writing his philosophical 
treatises. He was restored to favor ten years later, and was 
appointed tutor for the young Nero, a task he fulfilled until 
the year 62 A.D. This latter date marked the beginning ot 
Seneca's retirement. For three years he enjoyed the privacy ot 
home lite, during which time he wrote many ot his beautiful moral 
epistles to his friend Lucilius. In the year 65 A.D., it was 
recommended to him by Nero that he liquidate himselt.l3 In 
brief this is the general summary ot Seneca's lite. 
As a young lawyer at the court ot Caligula, as a senator 
during the reign ot Claudius, and virtually as administrator tor 
10. ~. xxix, 1. 
~. xlvii, 12. EP· xc, 14. 
11 ••• xx, 9 • 
• lxJ.i, 3. 
~· lxvii, 14. 
~. xci, 19. 
12. ~. Mackail, Latin Liter~~f' Charles Scribner's Sons,~ • 
13. Tacitus, Annales, xv. 
Suetonius, Vitae. 
(Chicago, Ill., : 
p. 172. 
Nero, Seneca passed the greater part of his life under the mad 
despotism of the Roman court. Lucas describes the situation: 
In a perfectly desperate position, with 
only one path before him, he could tread it fine-
ly; but it was a desperate position indeed, when 
that agile brain could not flnd a way round and justify itself to the same. 
7 
His good sense and judgment, together with an even tem-
pered disposition enabled Seneca to last at the court longer, 
perhaps, than others of the imperial advisors. He knew his Rome 
much better than many native-born Romans knew her.l5 During 
his tenure of office he was able to amass a fortune which in our 
coin would exceed fifteen million dollars, and held estates in 
various parts of the empire~6 
Such was the background in which Seneca tried to pursue the 
higher things of the mind. All his writings and philosophical 
teachings must be viewed in the light of the splendor--and con-
stant peril of the court. The morality he would set forth was to 
be no abstract set of formulae intended tor drawing-room perusal, 
or even as applicable to life in a normal situation. It was 
written by a man or action for men 
••• living under a reign of terror, whose lives were 
14. 
15. 
16. 
F.L. Lucas, seneca and the Elizabethan·Tra~edf, (Cambridge, Mass.: The University Press, 1 22 . p. 45. 
R.M. Gummere, Seneca the Philosopher and His Modern 
Message, (Boston: Marshall Jones Company,~22). p. 50. 
H.N. Fowler, A History of Roman Literature, (New York: 
D. Appleton and Company:-1932). P• 178 
in daily peril; and its object was to tree them from 
anxiety and brace their minds to meet their fate 
with indifference and dignity~? 
17. Holland, op. cit., p. 186. 
8 
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CHA.PrER II 
THE SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY AT ROME 
Seneca's thoughts on the subject or lite, death and the 
hereafter can be studied only after a thorough understanding or 
his entire philosophy or life, against the background or the 
divers schools of thought of his day. Terming philosophy the 
"vitae lex" ,18 he qualifies himself to formulate his own canons 
or belief in as much as the light or philosophy shines tor all, 
"philosophia ••• omnibus lucet"~9 Beginning his study, Seneca 
makes bold to say that he will cover the entire field of moral 
philosophy and solve all the problems arising therefrom, ffscis 
enim ~ moralem philosophiam valle conplecti ~ omnes ~ !!! 
pertinentia quaestiones explicareu.20 And as an end to be 
attained, we are warned that "auditionem ••• philosophorum ••• ~ 
propositum beatae vitae trahendam".21 
In the ages before the ideals of Christianity became the 
well nigh universal guide of men's lives, there arose period-
ically a creed especially adapted to the men or a given age.22 
In the first century A.D., it called itself Stoicism. Undoubt-
18. ~· xciv, 39. 
19. !I?.· xliv, 3. 
20. !£• cvi, 2. 
21. ~· cviii, 35. 
22. F.L. Lucas, Seneca and the Elizabethian Tragedy, 
Cambridge: The University Press, 1922). p. 47. 
10 
edlY the noblest and purest ot the ancient sects,23 Stoicism 
passed beyond the limit ot the schools and became at once a re-
ligious creed and a code ot morals tor every-day use in the lite 
ot Rome.24 The ancient school ot Stoicism had been founded by 
the Greek, Zeno,25 and received its name from the tact that Zeno 
had lectured on the Painted Porch or Stoa Poikile ot Athens. 
The Stoic doctrines lay tallow on Latin soil during several 
centuries before Christ.26 It had a good deal ot potential 
energy, but as such remained purely potential, until the birth ot 
Quintus Sextius Niger about 70 B.C. Two ot his scholars were 
sotion and Papirius Fabianus. As has been noted,27 these latter 
were followers ot Pythagoras but aided greatly the efforts ot 
~iger in formulating what they liked to consider a definitely 
Roman school. They were to inculcate their doctrines in the mind 
ot the young Seneca. Niger seems to have combined his stoic 
tendencies,28 with a number ot Pythagorean elements, and into it 
all "infused a fresh vigor ot moral zealn.29 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
F.W. Ferrar, Seekers after God, (London:---, 1874). 
intro., p. 5. ---
Ibid., P• 33. 
J.W. Mackail, Latin Literature, (Chicago, Ill.: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923). p. 171. 
Ad Helviam de Consolatione, xii, 4. 
~. lxxxiii-;-9. 
Holland, op. cit., p. 170. 
cr. ante, p. 4. 
!;e_. lxiv. 
J.E. Sandys, A Companion to Latin Studies, (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 192IT. p. 710. 
11 
The Romans wanted a system of rules which would govern con-
duct, the "quod ~ maius" of Q.uintilian..3° They were often 
kept back in the theological development of their ideas by a 
pragmatism that throttled the desire for knowledge, that subor-
dinated the search for the unknown to respect for what exists.31 
Whereas science concerns itself with the quest after truth re-
gardless of the consequences of its being brought to light, the 
Roman feared such consequences. And in conditions such as those 
in which Seneca lived, well he might fear them. In subsequent 
pages of this discussion it will be noted what effect such 
materialistic influences had on the thinking process of Seneca.32 
He could go just so far in formulating his independent system of 
morals, then when confronted by the impregnable barrier of the 
very practical consideration of life or death, he altered his 
plan of action to suit the circumstances. 
The Stoic school would have it that the soul is corporeal 
and that it grows to perfection of reason with the growth of the 
body. And since it is corporeal with the body, the soul ceases 
to exist at death.33 With this as a starting point, all good 
30. Institutiones Oratoriae, xii, 2. 
31. A. Grenier, The Roman Spirit, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 1926);--p. 397. 
32. Cf. post p. 71. 
33. C.T. Cruttwell, A History of Roman Literature, 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886). 
p. J88. 
~ 
----------------------------------------------------------------, 
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stoics taught the end of life, the flsummum bonum" of Seneca, was 
the agreement of man in thought and action with "natura:" "In-
terim, quod inter omnia Stoicos convenit rerum naturae adsentior 
-
••• sapientia ~.u34 This latter term was variously defined as 
the "nature of man", the nature of things in general", and the 
nnature of the universe". This harmony with nature is virtue 
(virtus), or wisdom (sapientia). Similarly, all things foolish 
(stulte) were vice, or a lack of harmony with nature. Things in 
between or events in general, as well as "fortuna", were classed 
as the "indifferentia".35 This school demanded not a mere curb-
ing of the passions in man, but their entire suppression and 
eradication. 
Utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an 
nullos, saepe quaesitum est. Nostri illos expel-
lunt, Peripatetic! temperant. Ego non video, quomodo 
salubrig esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas 
morbi.J 
The Stoic had a God reduced to unity from the many deities 
of early paganism. He was hardly a personality; in any case he 
had little relation with the universe. Lite and death were con-
sidered as "inditterentia",37 and were submitted to the choice 
ot the wise man. If it is appropriate tor him to remain in lite, 
34. ~ Vita Beata, iii, 3. 
35. ~· lxxxii, 10, 14. 
Cf. Cicero, ~ Finibus, iii, 50 tf. 
36. ~· cxvi, 1. 
37. ~· lxxxii, 10. 
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he does so; it the balance inclines to the other side as a con~ 
venient way ot obviating difficulties, the door is open. Nothing 
compels him to stay.38 This principle sanctions the Cato eulo-
gized so often by Seneca;39 it is likewise applicable to Seneca 
himself and a host of Stoics who during the reign ot Nero fol-
lowed his example. The continuous harping on this idea on the 
one hand, and on the other constant dread, made suicide extraor-
dinarily prevalent--suicide out ot pure ennui, discontent, or 
tear of the consequences of living.4° 
Viciously good and morbidly healthy,41 the Stoic sage put 
himself in the light ot a rigid corpse floating on the tide ot 
events.· He trained his will to will nothing.42 He thus lived 
in a sort ot subnormal or subconscious ease by reason ot his 
complete indifference to the tears--likewise the pleasures--sur- . 
rounding him. Stoicism, followed to its logical conclusions, 
may in many ot its tenets be termed a philosophy ot cowardice. 
Rather than tight the passions, the Stoics would be rid of them. 
Either as the savage they teared death with an intensity of ter-
ror; or glutted with the crimes or sorrows of lite, they found 
38. Sandys, op. cit., p. 709. 
39. ~· civ, 29. JP• lxxii, 12. 
!E.. lxxxii' 13. 
De Traniuillitate Animi, xvi, 1. 
De Pro~ dentia, 1, 11, 11-12. 
40. Ferrar, op. cit., p. 49. 
41. R! Constantia Sapientis, i, 1, 1. 
42. Lucas, op. cit., p. 47. 
~ -~------------------------------------------------------------~ 
14 
living insupportable and slunk to death as a refuge with a cow-
ardice which vaunted itself as courage.43 In so much as it 
advocated the elimination of inordinate passions, it shone 
brightly amid the profligacy of ancient Rome. 
In its practical aspects, Stoicism may be said to stand 
midway between the extremes of Epicureanism and Cynicism. The 
latter cult had but few adherents, ow reason ot its extreme pes-
simism. It may be termed the superlative--the reductio ad ab-
surdum--or the Stoics.44 The Cynics derived their name from the 
Greek word meaning "dog", from what appeared to some of the an-
cients to be the doglike brutality of their customs. Juvenal 
ironically remarks that the Stoics were the same as the Cynics, 
differing only "by a tunic" which the latter had discarded.45 
Referring to the concrete aspect of any Roman system of thought 
the Cynic principles are mentioned in Seneca only in extreme 
measures, when the milder torm of Stoic passivism would not stand 
up under the force ot circumstances.46 
Among Roman moralists the sect of Epicurus attracted few 
disciples. With its highest good the satisfaction ot man's sen-
sual or physical appetites the teachings ot the Epicureans did 
43. Ferrar, op. cit., p. 51. 
44. •seneca••, in Warner's Library of the World's Best 
Literature, p. 13132. -- -
45. Juvenal, ~· xiii, 122. 
46. !!!.• lxii, 3. 
~ Providentia, v, 7. 
~------------------------------------------~ r-
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not appeal to those whose efforts were bent either on correcting 
living, or on making life livable under prevailing conditions. 
The Stoics seeing their efforts thwarted, if not in fact, at 
least in the theory underlying the Epicurean system, carried the 
contest beyond the mere difference-of-opinion stage, as is 
clearly indicated in several passages in Seneca. He thus de-
scribes the Epicureans: "~ Epicureum, laudantem statum qui-
etae civitatis et inter convivia cantusque vitam exigentis.ff47 
- -
Along with their moral differences the Stoics took issue with 
the Epicureans, as they did in turn with the other schools tor 
their opinions on the hereafter, on the nature of God, the human 
soul and other tenets of their sect. 
The school of Epicurus held that the soul was as much cor-
poreal as was the body of an animal, that it was composed of 
very fine particles united in one mass.48 While the soul is 
said to be distributed over all the body, its chief seat is in 
the breast. Virtue is pursued because it is the means of being 
tranquil, of getting more rest, "corpus sine dolore ••• animus 
~ perturbatione."49 Since life was believed to terminate 
with death, the soul being mortal, the summum bonum of this 
47. !:e.· lxxxviii, 5. 
Warner's Library, etc. op. cit., p. 13132. 
Sandys, op. cit., p. 707. 
48. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, III. 
49. ~· lxvi, 45. 
~--------------------~ 
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school was complete physical well-being. There was a multi-
plicity of gods living in the inter.mundia or space between the 
world of matter and world of nothingness, but they had absolute-
lY no control or any relation whatsoever with the affairs of men. 
TheY endeavored to prove this latter point by noting the inequal 
ity in the apportionment of the goods and evils of life.5° 
It often happened that the doctrines of Epicurus were held 
to the charge of corrupting morals, and leading men into lives 
of degeneration.51 So claimed, for the most part, the whole 
sect of the Stoics. 52 But as Seneca well notes·in several 
places, "many have recourse to him through a bad motive thinking 
that they will have in him a screen for their own vices.•53 
Atter the time of Cicero and more especially in the reign 
of Augustus, the teachings of Pythagoras were revived, and blend-
ed all the prevalent systems of Plato, Zeno and Epicurus with a 
sort of mystic tinge. Pythagoras is said to have coined the 
word "philosophy" when replying to a question as to what he con-
sidered himself in the domain of rationality. He answered "a 
philosopher" (a seeker after wisdom), for he considered it the 
50. Sandys, op. cit., p. 698. 
51. !E_. xxxiii, 2. 
52. De Vita Beata, xiii, 2. 
53. !E.· xxi, 10. 
De Vita Beata, xiii, 2. 
Ibid., xii, 4. 
~---------------------------------. 
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height of arrogance for one to think himself a sage, that is, one 
who has acquired knowledge. 54 Adherents of Pythagoreanism be-
lieved in the soul, a spiritual substance in man. All actions of 
this life should be performed in view of an infinite future. 
More definitely than did the other schools, Pythagoreanism propa-
gated the belief in a future life, and went even to the extent .of 
giving a form to this belief. Once the soul leaves the body it 
goes to Hades, an underground stopping place, where it is puri-
fied, awaiting reincarnation. It returns to earth again for new 
trials, and will inhabit animate, vegetable, animal or human 
life, higher or lower forms of existence, depending on how well 
it has merited. "Nulla anima interit, ~ cessat quidem nisi 
tempore exiguo, dum in aliud corpus transfunditur."55 In his 
De Beneficiis, Seneca tells us an interesting and rather amusing 
story of an exact Pythagorean who would pay back the debt he owed 
to a friend now dead. At first the philosopher planned to keep 
the money owed his friend, the latter having died. The neigh-
bors, however, reminded him of his own preaching that we continue 
to exist after death and that in view of this fact he still owed 
the debt. Suddenly aware of his inconsistency, or perhaps of 
this practical application of his creed, the philosopher went to 
54. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. viii, cap. ii. 
55. ~· cviii, 19. 
~--------------------------------~ 
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the shop of his deceased friend, flung the money through the open 
door, and chided himself for having had a temptation to infidel-
ity.56 The doctrine, therefore, abounds in ascetic precepts 
tending to insure purity of sou1. 57 Sotion, the Pythagorean, 
forbade Seneca to eat flesh meat, lest he commit parricide by 
injuring the soul of an ancestor with either teeth or fork.5S 
They practiced frugality, temperance and vegetarianism, and had 
many followers in Rome.59 As did the Stoics, these men believed 
in the utter destruction ot the passions. fl8olebat dicere Fabi-
60 anus (Pythagorianus) ••• contundi debere, ~ vellicari.fl 
56. De Beneticiis, vii, 21. 
57. Grenier, op. cit., p. 372. 
58. ~· cviii, 19. 
59. Ibid., 17. 
60. ~ Brevitate Vitae, x, 1. 
~------~----------------------------. 
-
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CHAPI'ER III 
SOURCES OF SENECAN PHILOSOPHY 
such were the systems o~ thought to which Seneca was ex-
posed, from which he could and did draw ~reely in evolving a new 
and, if not a more practical, at least a more pleasant standard 
of action and living. While he cautions us "~ veritatem quae-
rtmus,"61 it is doubtful if Seneca had any objective ideal o~ 
truth in mind. His many inconsistencies and contradictions il-
lustrate his attitude of making his principles subject to the 
exigencies o~ the time. The result of his entire investigations 
leaves the riddle of life still unsolved for Seneca, ffquod est 
!pessimum numguam sciens cuius esses status.ff62 Senecan teaching 
~as a sort of amalgamation of the moral principles o~ Zeno, Epi-
curus and Pythagoras, "Nostram accipe. Nostram autem ~ dico, 
!!2!! alligo !!!! ad ~ aliquem ~ Stoicis proceribus; lli et mihi 
censendi ius."63 In this respect Seneca was like many of the 
Roman Stoics, eclectic or encyclopaedic in his views. 64 Though 
these various teachers differed in so much as the first mentioned 
61. 
62. 
63. 
De Otio, iii, 1. 
Ad Mareiam de Consolatione, xvii, 1. 
De Vita Beata, iii, 2. 
Alb~Grenierl The Roman Spirit, (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf. 1926}.--p. 397. 
F.J. Miller, Seneca's Tragedies, (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1917). intro. p. 8. 
J.E. Sandys, A Companion to Latin Studies, (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 192IT. p. 710. 
~----------------~ 
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proceeded from idealism, the second from materialism, and the 
third from a sort of spiritualism, it mattered little since their 
precepts came to the same thing. 65 Seneca showed an indiffer-
ence to exact scientific theory and rather a willingness to take 
good moral teac.hing as his own, regardless of the quarter from 
which it came. 66 As Teuffel puts it, 
He started from the Stoic system but in him 
its barren austerity was toned down, the harshness 
softened, its crotchets·laid aside; nor did he dis-
dain additions from the other systems.o7 
seneca had a genial and tolerant nature which made it most agree-
able for him to become a sort of pluralist. He was little able 
to tolerate general admonitions which were irrevocable, but 
rather made up his world from his own personal investigations and 
ideas. 68 He would address his followers n~ Stoica lingua,~ 
hac submissiore.n69 He considered himself a thorough-going 
Stoic,7° an ingenious and virtuous philosopher. 71 Nevertheless 
he makes it plain that he does not want to be bound by this 
65. De Vita Beata, xiii, 1. !E· lxvi, 47. 
66. John W. Basore, nseneca's Moral Essays", in Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge: The University Press, 
1935). vol. i, intro. 
67. Miller, op. cit., intro. 
68. R.M. Gummere, Seneca the Philosopher and His Modern 
Message, (Boston: Marshall Jones Co.,-r92~p. 5o. 
69. ~· xiii, 4. 
70. De Tranquillitate Animi, i, 10. 
71. F.W. Farrar, Seekers after~' (London:---, 1874}. 
p. 161. 
!E_. cvi, 2. 
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school exclusively: "Nullius nomen fero."72 In general, he 
would not be in complete obeisance to any of his predecessors; 
be could feel this way about it, for heresy is not a word in the 
vocabulary of philosophy.73 
The bitter feud which waged through the ages between the 
stoics and Epicureans might serve to illustrate the tenacity 
with which these schools maintained their respective points of 
view. And therefore, we can but admire the open-minded view 
taken by Seneca when he repeatedly quotes Epicurus as the author-
ity for a point he is making.74 He explains this liberal view 
of the matter, saying that he intends to praise the dicta of all 
schools: 
Ut scias quam benigni simus, propositum est 
aliena laudare; Epicuri est aut Metrodori aut ali-
cuius ex illa officina. ~t quid interest quid 
dixerit? Omnibus dixit.75 
Seneca maintains that those who "in verba iurant ~ quid dicatur 
aestimant," should realize that whatever has been said well 
should be regarded as "communis".76 And in another letter he 
72. ~· xlv, 4. 
73. F.L. Lucas, Seneca and Elizabethan Tragedy, (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1922). p. 47~ 
74. ~· xvii, 11 (on wealth). 
~· xviii, 14 (on anger). 
~· xx, 9, (on Poverty). 
~· xxv, 5, (on sincerity). 
~· xxii, 5, (on danger). 
75. ~· xiv, 17. 
76. ~· xii, 11. 
~· xiii, 8. 
~----------------~ 
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tellS us that he is wont to cross into the enemy's camp, not as a 
deserter but as a scout, "soleo enim et in aliena castra tran-
sir~, .!!,2!! tamquam transtuga, sed tamquam explorator.n77 His 
-tolerant attitude leads him to condemn any type ot complete men-
tal slavery to the opinions ot others. He definitely makes this 
point, when he writes to Lucilius: "Primum exponam, quid Stoicis 
videatur: deinde ~dicere sententiam audebo ••• Ego ~idem 
78 
sentio." Earlier, Seneca had written that even if the Stoics 
did revere their masters in the past, "non sumus sub rege; sibi 
auisque ~ vindicat.n79 Fo~he notes, it a man always follows 
the opinions ot one person, his place is not in the senate house 
but out among the anarchists, "quoniam si quia semper unius se-
iqui tur, ~ in curia sed in facti one est. • 80 
As evidenced in his works, Seneca was possessed ot a mind 
quick and brilliant, but not sure or thorough in its conclusions. 
~ile his system of eclecticism may appear reasonable, it was 
certainly not consistently workable either in theory or in prac-
tice. True, it was practicable in the sense of its being mate-
rialistic and utilitarian in outlook; but its want ot logic in 
arrangement, its failure to be universally applicable, its lack 
ot psychological appeal, make Seneca's philosophy less easy to 
77. !E.. ii' 5. 
78. ~· cxvii, 1. 
79. !2· xxxiii, 4. 
80. De Otio, iii, 1. 
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describe and actually use, than to understand. 81 When he at-
tempted to make his teaching applicable to his own every day 
life, he fell far short of even approximating his goal, and the 
inconsistency led him beyond all question into serious errors 
which deeply compromise his character. 82 
After we have culled a uniform system of thought from 
seneca's volumes of moral instructions, we find too often little 
conviction in the admonitions he sets forth. Claiming the priv-
ilege to legislate for himself, he grants the same benefit to 
others. While this procedure might indicate openness of mind and 
consideration for the differences of opinion, the implied asser-
tion is that there actually is no certain standard of truth, that 
philosophic findings are entirely subjective, that is, depending 
entirely on just what a person wishes to find. In theiilSelves 
~enecan instructions are perhaps unequalled among pagan works in 
~atural goodness and virtue. 83 
The Apostle of the Gentiles, the greatest of the Christian 
~reachers, was haunted by the dread, as he put it, "lest having 
preached to others I myself became a castaway.ff84 It was, per-
81. Francis Holland, Seneca, (London: Longmans, Green 
and Company, 1920). p. 164. 
82. Ferrar, op. cit., p. 34. 
83. J.W. Mackail, Latin Literature, (Chicago, Ill.: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923). p. 174. 
Ferrar, op. cit., intro. p. 5. 
84. I Cor. ix, 27. 
~-· --------, 
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haps, his humility and candid admission of frailty that saved 
him• Seneca, however, was less humble and, as a result, less 
consistent. For when his morals have been reduced to practice, 
hiS deeds continually belie his own preaching: a eulogist of 
freedom and the tutor of a tyrant; a decrier of courtiers and 
yet never leaving the Palatine himself; one condemning flatterers 
yet author of the most debasing adulation of Messalina and Claud-
ius' freedman; the enemy of riches and yet the possessor of over 
fifteen million dollars. 85 
In Seneca we witness a man whose life was a tragic failure; 
this, because in the opposite of Dante's sense, he had not train-
ed himself to make "great refusals". 86 The principle which led 
to his spiritual degradation was moral compromise. In a preca-
rious position at the court of Nero, he endeavored to work on the 
principle of encouraging what was wrong in the vain hope of pre-
venting something worse. He did succeed in staving off the ter-
rible disaster. The delay, however, did but add to the intensity 
of the flame once it broke out. Fearful of the danger to his own 
life, as also of the other consequences in adhering to the path 
of righteousness, Seneca cleverly avoided distasteful issues. 
Clever he was indeed, but less clever he had proved a good deal 
85. Lucas, op. cit., p. 45. 
86. Ibid., p. 52 
~----~--------~ 
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•ore edifying. 87• 
As the most fluent, tolerant and persuasive of Roman in-
structors of morals, Seneca demonstrated in the trying crises of 
hiS life how hard it was to be brave, consistent or even free 
from crime under the mad despotism of a Caligula, a Claudius, or 
a Nero. 88 While he prided himself as being a gifted philoso-
pher, he undertook the impossible task of living as an upright 
man89 and pursuing the course of a statesman under the Caesars~ 
More than most people he desired to do the correct thing, but it 
was in his nature to hate more than most other people the un-
pleasant things, especially unpleasantness with other people.91 
By not taking the lofty line of duty that Zeno would have taken, 
seneca permitted the element of expediency to be the standard of 
his conduct, rather than to hold to obligation regardless of the 
outcome. No man ever gained anything but contempt and ruin by 
continually wavering between two opinions. Mr. Froude well de-
lineated the character of Seneca, when he refers us to Bunyan's 
Pilgrim's Progress: 
Of all unsuccessful men, in every shape, 
whether divine or human or devilish, there is none 
equal to Bunyan's Mr. Facing-both-ways--the fellow 
with one eye on heaven and one on earth--who sin-
87. Ibid., p. 45. Lucas, op. cit., 
88. "Seneca," in Warner's Library of the World's Best 
Literature, p. 13119. -- ---
89. ~· cvi, 2. 
90. De Otio, 1, 4. 
91. Lucas;-op. cit., p. 45. 
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cerely preaches one thing and sincerely does an-
other, and from the intensity of his unreality is 
unable either to see or feel the contradiction. 
He is substantially trying to cheat both God and 
the devil, and is in reality only cheating himself 
and his neighbors. This of all characters upon the 
earth appears to us to be the one of which there is 
no hope at all.92 
Lucas writes that Seneca had ~ore intellect than his will-
power could carry.n93 Seneca, with his moral acrobatics and 
supple complaisance, presents himself to us as an inconsistent 
teacher of right living. His life and doctrines are unintel-
ligible save in the light of his political background. 
92. Ferrar, op. cit., 
93. Lucas, op. cit., 
p. 163 
P• 38. 
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OHAPI'ER IV 
SENECA'S CONCEPTION OF GOD 
When Seneca counselled Lucilius to investigate "quae ~­
teria sit dei,"94 we may rightfully assume that he was in sin-
cere quest of the fundamental source of life and being. In old 
age, he repeated the necessity of knowing God when he wrote that 
man will never make real progress until he has the right idea of 
God, "numquam satis profectum erit, nisi qualem debet deum mente 
oonceperit ••• "95 A statement such as either of the ones just 
quoted shows by far a greater depth of intellect, indicative 
perhaps of a real earnestness of purpose, than one in which he 
refers to the heavenly bodies as divinities, "paucorum motus 
comprehendimus, innumerabiles ~ longiusque ~ conspectu seduc-
ti di eunt redeunt."96 Here Seneca does but follow the ancient 
theory of the Stoics that the stars were so many gods. His ac-
tual convictions on the subject of divinity are rather difficult 
to analyze in so far as his works contain many conflicting ref-
erences pertaining to the deity. First let us see how nearly 
Seneca came to truth in his theological vagaries. Afterwards 
his pagan explanations will be brought out. From a considera-
tion of these two elements, we shall try to come to some con-
94. De Brevitate Vitae, xix, 1. 
95. !E.· xcv, 48. 
96. De Beneficiis, iv, 23, 4. 
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elusion as to just what conception he had of the Divinity. 
Some of the eminent doctors of the early Church speak ad-
miringly of the erudition and apparent Christian sentiments ex-
pressed by Seneca. He is quoted by Tertullian,97 and by Lactan-
tius. Even St. Augustine refers in many places to Seneca and 
thiS in an approving manner.98 Lactantius is, perhaps, the most 
pointed when he says that Seneca speaks "as one of us": 
He was the sharpest of all the Stoics. How 
great a veneration has he for the Almighty. And 
how many other things does this heathen speak of 
God, like one of us.99 
Now it is safe to state that these encomiums are lavished 
on Seneca solely by reason of his expressions of reverence for 
God. His entire code of morality evidences nothing more than 
good sense, practicality, expediency; it wants in its entirety 
any semblance of a supernatural motive. Seneca strikes the key-
note of one of the natural proofs of the existence of God, when 
~e says that even in our very souls there is that unlearned 
~owledge, or better perhaps, that unlearned realization of the 
existence of a Supreme Being. While this innate respect and rev-
ence for Divinity exists in every man, still the words of Seneca 
97. Tertullian, Apologetica, x~~. (not extant) 
98. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Lib. v, Cap. vii, ix. 
Ibid., Lib. ix,-cap. iv. ---
Ibid., Lib. vi, Cap. x. 
Ibid., Lib. vi, Cap. xi. 
99. Divinae Institutiones, Lib. i, Cap. l. 
Cf. Tertullian, De Anima. 
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give a definite expression to the fact that he is so impelled, 
ttanimum tuum quadam religionis suspicione percutiet.n100 
-
As to acknowledging the true, living God, Seneca comes 
verY near to orthodox theology in such remarks as "it is God who 
bas set free the oxen throughout the earth;"101 "it is God, our 
Master, who draws forth ••• ;"102 "God is worshipped by those who 
knOW Him."l03 The Deity is termed the "artifex divinus", de-
signer or the universe.l04 
Almost in Scriptural phrasing, Seneca affirms the omni-
presence of God in the vast expanses or the universe: "Q,uooumque 
te flexeris, ibi illum videbis ooourrentem tibi; nihil ab illo 
- -- - --
vacat, opus~ ipse implet~"l05 The Christian doctrine of 
•God within us" might possibly be construed in the words "et 
106 socii sumus eius (dei) et membra." The soul of man must be 
in a ri tting condition "purus .!.£ sanctus, •• or there is no room 
for God: "Q,uis sit summi boni locus quaeris? Animus. Hie nisi 
purus .!.£ sanctus est deum ~ capit."107 And another instance: 
"Prope est .! te deus, tecum est intus est. Ita dico, Luoili: 
sacer intra .!!.2!! spiritus sedet ••• Bonus ~vir sine deo ~ 
100. ~· xli, 3. 
101. De Benericiis, iv, 6, 5. 
102. Ibid., iv, 6, 1. 
103. ~· xcv, 48. 
104. ~· cxiii, 16. 
105. De Beneficiis, iv, 8,2. 
106. ~· xcii, 30. 
107. !£• lxxxvii, 21. 
"108 
est• ;:::.;;;--
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In the same letter he applies Virgil's words to com-
plate his own thoughts, "In unoquoque virorum. bonorum 'Q.uis deus 
incertum est, habitat deus.'"l09 Conversely, but as definitely 
in accord with Christian teaching, a soul without God is in a 
bad state: "Deus ad homines venit, immo quod propius, in homines 
venit; nulla sine deo ~bona est."110 
-
Omniscience is an attribute of the Almighty by virtue of 
which He knows all things, even our inmost thoughts. Seneca 
seems to recognize this secret Witness and Judge of our conduct. 
"~uid enim prodest ab homine aliquid ~ secretum? Nihil deo 
clusum est. Interest animis nostris et cogitationibus mediis 
interveni t. "lll And again when he warns: ~ta dico, Lucili: 
sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum ob-
servator et custos. Hie prout ~ nobis tractatus est, ita E£! 
ipse tractat."112 
Divine Providence is recognized in terms worthy of one of 
the Great Fathers, "God also has given certain gifts to the 
whole human race, and from these no man is shut out," (Deus quo-
108. ~· xli, 2. 
Cf. Nat. Q.uaes. ii, x, 3. 
Cf. Chas. P. Parker, ffSacer Intra Nos Spiritus," in 
Harvard studies in Classical Philology, vol. xvii. 
109. ~· xli, 2. 
Cf. Naturales Quaestiones, x, 3. 
Cf. Aeneid, viii, 352. 
110. ~· lxxiii, 16. 
111. ~· lxxxiii, 2. 
112. ~· xli, 2. 
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~ _g,uaedam munera universe humane generi dedit, !. quibus exclu-
ditur nemo). 113 He tells Lucilius to consider always the bless-
ings of our heavenly Father, "proinde, quisquis ~ ••• cogita quan-
114 ~ hobis tribuerit parens noster." And also in this passage: 
"9,.Uidquid nobis bono futurum erat, deus et parens noster in pro-
115 ~ posuit." Seneca even defends Divine Providence against 
the accusation of the Epicurean Lucilius, that the number of 
evils in the world proves the want of' a just, guiding hand: 
~uaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ista, si provi-
dentia mundus regeretur, multa bonis viris mala 
acciderent. Hoc commodius in contextu operis red-
deretur, cum praeesse universis providentiam pro-
baremus et interesse nobis deum.llb 
To prove our fidelity in the way of' righteousness, it often 
seems good to God to try us, and this, as Christian doctrine 
teaches, because He loves us. Seneca gives one Christian expla-
nation for suffering in saying that God greatly loving the good 
(deus bonorum amantissimus), wishes them to become strong in 
~irtue (illos optimos atque excellentissimos vult), sends the 
just many trials to exercise them (f'ortunam illis cum qua ~­
ceantur adsignat). 117 He seems to express this point in a 
]_arallel manner: "Patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum 
113. De Beneficiis, iv, 28, 3. 
114. Ibid., ii, 29, 4. 
115. ~· ex, 10. 
116. De Providentia, i, 1. 
117. Ibid., ii, 7. 
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et illos fortiter amat ~ 'operibus,' inquit, 
-
exagitentur, ut verum colligant robur.•n118 
-
views and disciplines those "quos amat." 119 
'doloribus, damnis 
God hardens, re-
And he says that 
he has trained his will to obey God submissively in the trials 
and troubles of life: "In omnibus, quae adversa videntur et dura, 
120 
sic tormatus ~: ~ pareo ~' sed adsentior." 
-
"Ex animo 
illum, ~ quia necesse est, sequor.n121 It would be well for 
Lucilius to recognize His guiding hand also: "Optimum est pati, 
Q.uod emandare .!!£!!. possis, et deum quo auctore ouncta proveniunt, 
sine murmuratione comitari.n122 A truly worthy gem is found in 
a passage where Seneca says true freedom means serving God, "Deo 
parere libertas est.n123 Summing up man's moral responsibili-
ties, "habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: 'Deum seque-
re.'ttl24 We cannot help drawing attention here to the likeness 
of the same sentiment so often expressed in Holy Scripture. The 
Old Testament abounds125 in admonitions similar to this pagan 
118. De Providentia, ii, 6. 
119. Ibid., iv, 7. 
120. Ibid., v, 7. 
121. Ibid., v, 7. 
~· xcvi, 2. 
122. ~· cvii, 9. 
123. De Vita Beata, xv, 6. 
124. Ibi~xv, 6. 
Boethius (De Consolatione, i, 4.) credits this maxim 
to Pythagoras. Cicero to one of the Seven Sages (De 
Finibus, iii, 22; iv.}. 
125. Ct. Ps. xxiii, 6. 
Ps. xxvi, 8. 
Ps. l:xviii, 33. 
Ps. cvi, 4. 
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dictum. Even a greater similarity is noticeable in the words of 
the son of God Himself, when He invites us, "veni, sequere 
~;"126 as also those of His apostles who were glad to reply, 
•et secuti sumus te." 
----- Now did Seneca stop here, he surely could be taken for one 
o! the Christian apologists. But we hasten to add that the re-
semblance, however striking, between Senecan phrases and Chris-
tian literature is nothing but a marvelous coincidence. As in-
dicative of his credence in the true God or as having accurate 
conceptions of His nature, the apparent Christian phrases of 
~eneca should bear no more weight than his prophecy concerning 
~he discovery of the great New World. 127 He states both ideas 
~ith the same attitude of uncertainty and as being up to the 
~pinion of anyone considering the subjects. In his system of 
eclectic thought each subject was something novel and, as far as 
~e could see, about as possible as the grata dicta made by other 
philosophers. His expressions of belief in God must not be taken 
for more than they are actually worth. 128 The crux of the issue 
would be: are his ideas, his spirit, Christian? His definition 
and explanation of the word ~ will throw considerable light on 
just what he revered in the divinity. 
126. Matt. xix, 21. 
127. Mad. 370. 
128. C.T. Cruttwell, A History of Roman Literature, (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886). p. 388. 
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Seneca's various meanings for the word deus include the 
following: a) ff{Deus), mundus cuncta complectens rectorque uni-
versi tt; 129 b) ffSic ~ Naturam .!.Q£!!, Fa tum, Fortunam; omnia 
eiusdem dei nomina sunt varia utentis ~ potestate";l30 c) more 
-
in a pantheistic line, he says that "when you say Nature, you 
merely give another name to God, for Nature is God and the Di-
vine Reason that pervades the whole universe and all its parts: 
you may call him 'Iovem Optimum~ Maximum,' 'Tonantem et Stato-
rem,' 'Liberum Patrem,' 'Herculem,' 'Mercurium,• and even if you 
-
name Him 'Fatum,' ·~ mentieris.•n131 In fine, "any name that 
you choose will be properly applied to Him if it connotes soae 
force that operates in the domain of heaven--His titles may be as 
countless as His benefits."132 
His inquiries into the nature and activity of God give 
somewhat of an introduction to the pantheistic and at times ag-
nostic theories which he entertained concerning the Divinity. 
~e must seek to discover what God is; whether He gazes indiffer-
ently and without concern upon the works of His creation or 
actually controls them.133 Possibly in a moment of sadness 
Seneca chose to adopt the negative thesis as indicated by such 
129. De Vita Beata, viii, 4. 
130. De Benefic11s, iv, 8, 3. 
131. Ibid., iv, 7, 1. 
132. Ibid., iv, 8, 3. 
133. De Otio, iv, 2. 
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, statements as, God is unconcerned about us and turns His back on 
the world; that our good deeds mean no more to Him than our 
railure to pursue virtue.134 That his God did not exist as a 
personality, is clearly brought out in both the sense and gram-
matical construction of such expressions as: "Nempe universa ~ 
materia et!! deo constant ••• ~uod tacit, quod est deus •••• n135 
-
The word "quod" can be rendered only as "that which", possibly 
in the sense of "whatever it is which"; in any case a definitely 
neuter term indicative of a non-intelligent material force. 
That Seneca's theories on the existence of the true God 
did not hold his own complete faith is clearly brought out in 
the many rather unconscious references he makes to the "gods". 
The word "unconscious" is used here in the sense that although 
as an individual thinker he had delineated many of the attributes 
of the true God, Seneca was for all practical purposes strongly 
imbued with, and subconsciously in accord with all pagan concep-
tions of the plurality of gods. The "dii immortales" of almost 
every Latin writer antedating the complete triumph of Christian-
ity, is a common expression throughout Seneca's works. If we are 
cautioned to keep in mind the "vetus praeceptum: 'deum seque-
1""'e ' "l 36 1 t 1 h ~  we are a so o d t at the man who so instructs us in 
134. De Beneficiis, iv, 4, 1. 
135. ~· lxv, 24. 
136. De Vita Beata, xv, 6. 
Cf. ante, p. 31. 
rlrguing the case for the gods, "causam deorum agam."l37 
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If 
seneca tells us that "parens noster", and "~", and "provi-
dentia" is the custodian of man's welfare, he likewise says that 
~n is indebted to "dis" for the "salutem, vitam, et spiritum.J38 
"Deus" is worshipped by those who know Him, Seneca succinctly 
-
reminds us, but in fewer than a score of lines further on, we 
learn that "(Di) ••• nocere ~ possunt. Nee accipere iniuriam 
_g,ueunt nee facere."139 "Pater~", God our Father, may try 
our faithfulness by sufferings so we are taught; later the ob-
ject of our reverence has taken on a plural aspect, "ceterum 
castigant quosdam et coercent et inrogant poenas et aliquando 
specie boni puniunt."140 
Egoism is, in fact, at the bottom of most of his precepts 
and theories. He admits, it is true, that there exists something 
which, if not superior to man is at least, out of the sphere of 
human life, and he calls it by the abstract term, "deus". As 
has been noted, he predicated supreme attributes to this being. 
~till, Seneca says that a good man differs from deus only in the 
element of time, "immo etiam necessitudo et similitude, quoniam 
141 ~uidem bonus tempore tantum ~ deo differt." It will be made 
137. De Providentia, i, 1. 
138. De Beneficiis, ii, 30. 
139. ~. xcv, 48, 49. 
140. Ibid., xcv, 50. 
141. De Providentia, i, 6. 
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olear later, how Seneca opines that suicide "promittit ut parem 
... f . t n142 b tf 1 th t deO ac1a , a more oas u assurance an any other sys em 
-of philosophy attempted to make. He may refer to the "maiesta-
tem", and the "bonitatem", ot 11qui praesident mundo,n143 but we 
---- 144 
must also know that, "sapiens .£:!:!!!!dis ~pari vivit." Far 
from the humble attitude of a Christian, in his relations with 
the Creator, Seneca assumes the attitude of socius in his rela-
tions with God. 145 
Seneca tells us that the best way to worship the gods is 
to believe in them to acknowledge their majesty and goodness, to 
imitate them. 146 Far otherwise are his sentiments, quoted by 
St. Augustine, from Seneca's lost work, Contra Superstitionem: 
All these things, a wise man will observe 
for the law's sake, more than for the god's; and 
all this rabble of deities which the superstition 
of ages has gathered together, we are in such man-
ner to adore, as to consider the worship to be 
rather matter of custom than of conscience.l47 
Commenting hereon, St. Augustine says: "This illustrious 
142. ~· lxxxviii, 
143. ~· xcv, 50. 
144. ~· lix, 14. 
145. ~· liii, 11. 
De Providentia, vi, 6. 
Ibid., I, 5, 7. 
146. Ep. xcv, 50. 
147. "Contra Superstitionem", in De Civitate Dei, 
St. Augustine, Lib. vi, Cap.-ro. ---
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senator worshipped what he disapproved, acted what he disliked, 
~d adored what he condemned.nl48 Fabius remarked that it was 
a great pity that he who could what he would did not always make 
the best choice. It were perhaps more correctly stated that he 
who could do what he would, would not always make the best 
choice. 
Did Seneca consider this "sequere deum"149 sufficiently 
important, he certainly would not have permitted himself to lapse 
into such glaring inconsistencies. The frequency with which he 
~ecurs to the subject gives us the impression that he aspired to 
~ow the truth. But as was noted earlier in this work, Seneca 
was the typical Roman thinker, fearful of the consequences of 
discovering truth; realizing the necessity of following logical 
ponvictions to their obvious conclusions and lacking the will-
~ower to do so; and in general, handicapped by the first premise 
pf an ergo that had to be reached. This latter was at all times 
to be governed by that bane of any upright standard of life, ex-
pediency. He was correct in his conviction that mere thoughts 
~nd dialectics on the subjects of the deity, purpose of life, 
etc., must be reduced to practice, or they meant nothing at all 
other than whiling away one's time on idle fancies. But seneca 
148. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Lib. vi, Cap. 10. 
149. De Vita Beata, xv, 7. 
Ct. ante, p. Jl, J4. 
erred in throttling his own mental powers by making them sub-
servient to convenient living. His thoughts must accomodate 
themselves to his actions--his deeds were made answerable to no 
ethical standard of morality. His was a system full of conces-
sions. 
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CHAPrER V 
SENECA'S IDEAS OF THE HUMAN SOUL 
In studying the human soul, Seneca begins by saying that 
the soul "animus" of man is a living being, "animal", using the 
latter ter.m in its generic sense. He says the soul is living 
because it effects our own existence as living beings, "ipse 
efficiat ut simus animalia"; 150 that it is from the root word 
•anima" that the term soul (animal, which means a living being) 
takes its source, "~ ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint.n151 
continuing to describe the essence of the soul, Seneca launches 
into arguments widely divergent in meaning. In strict accord 
~ith the tenets of the school of Epicurus, which maintained that 
the soul was composed of minute particles, atoms, diffused 
through the body152--in other words that the soul was one with 
the body--Seneca says with questionable logic, «quae corporis 
bona sunt, corpora~: ergo et quae animi ~· Nam et hoc 
corpus est.nl53 The fact that the bodily goods are material 
because they are appreciated by the material body, in no wise 
proves Seneca's "ergo"; the misplaced second premise and the con-
clusion are dissociated from the first premise. His "nam" phrase 
150. ~· cxiii, 2. 
151. Ibid., cxiii, 2. 
152. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, iii. 
153. ~· cvi, 4-5. 
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is purely a gratum dictum, an assertion and nothing more. Con-
tinuing, Seneca says man's good must be corporeal, since man 
himself is corporeal--"bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, ~ 
!Pse sit corporalis.nl54 From these two citations it is evi-
dent that Seneca affirms the material composition of the soul--
he doesn't prove it as he pretends to do. "Animus corpus 
!!l,"l55 is exactly what he intends to say. Did Seneca believe 
in his own assertions? Was he himself convinced that he had 
proved the corporeal existence of the soul? This is hardly pos-
sible in view of the position he maintains throughout most of 
his works. Why then did he argue in the aforementioned vein? 
Judging from the inconsistencies appearing throughout the length 
and breadth of his philosophical teaching, we may assume that 
Seneca herein merely states an hypothesis. As in the case of 
his entire system, Seneca endeavors to prove actually nothing. 
Independent of the masters of philosophy as we have seen him 
above,l56 he composed his own credo--and allowed the same priv-
ilege to others. 
Most of Senecan teachings on the composition and nature of 
the human soul are found in the treatise Ad Marciam de Consola-
tione. Therein he analizes the soul of man, and attributes to 
154. ~· cvi, 5. 
155. ~· cvi, 4. 
156. Cf. ante, p. 18 ff. 
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it activity and quality which can be possessed only by a spirit-
ual or immaterial substance. First of all he gives us an inti-
mation of the pre-existence ot the soul before its union with 
the body. Once released, he tells us, from the weight of earth-
lY dross (the body), the soul flies back ("revolant") more 
lightly to the place of its origin (~ores ad originem ~};5? 
Again he says that the soul after death will be "restored to its 
tirst state," in integrum restitui, 158 "unde demissus est.n159 
It is nature that has bestowed on man his soul, or "entrusted it 
160 to man" (natura quae prior nobis credidit), and Seneca asks 
concerning death, what hardship should it be in returning to the 
place from whence one has come, "reverti ~ veneris quid grave 
est?"161 The soul animates the body, resides in 'it as in the 
darkness ot gross matter and as something held therein by chains, 
162 
"cetera ••• vincula animorum tenebraeque ~·" Out of its 
natural element, presumably the immaterial world ot spirit, the 
soul is "crushed strangled, and stained" as it resides in the 
body, and is "kept tar .from its true and natural sphere," 
(obruitur, ottocatur, inticitur, arcetur a veris et suis in 
falsa coiectus). 163 The souls ot men find no joy lingering in 
157. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxiii, 1. 
158. Ibid., xxii--, 3. 
159. Ibid., xxiv, 5. 
160. De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 3. 
161. Ibid., xi, 4. 
162. Ad Marciam de Conso1atione, xxiv, 5. 
163. Ibid., xxiv:-5. 
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chafe against the narrow bounds or the 
bOdY, "~ umquam magnis ingenis ~ inoorpore ~ est; e:x:ire 
atgue erumpere gestiunt, aegre has angustias ferunt,n164 as 
-
theY strive to attain the liberty and freedom or the universe to 
which they are accustomed, •vagi per ~' sublimes. et ~ alto 
165 Adsueti humana despioere." 
In man Seneca speaks or the soul as "~ pars quae melior 
est."166 That property or a man which can neither be given 
-
away nor taken away by another--"guod proprium hominis estn167 __ 
is his rational soul, "animus et ratio in animo.n168. Man's 
thinking apparatus is his soul, for "rationale enim antmal est 
homo.n169 
-
164. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, :x::x:iii, 2. 
165. Ibid., :x::x:iii, 2. 
166. De Constantia Sapientis, vi, .3. 
167. ~· xli, 8. 
168. Ibid., :x:li, 8. 
169. Ibid., xli, 8. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SENECA ANALl"ZES CONSCIENCE 
Closely allied with the subject of the nature of the soul 
of man is that faculty of the soul we term "conscience". Nowhere 
in the writing of antiquity has this inward voice of approval or 
condemnation been so graphically described, in itself and in its 
operations, as in the works of Seneca. Strange paradox as it may 
seem, Seneca maintains in no uncertain terms that we are account-
able to conscience for the actions we perform. He implies the 
existence of conscience when he says there are some benefits that 
have a value even greater than life itself, "quaedam beneficia 
~ maiora vita."l70 But there must be some judge who passes 
verdict on the relative values of the beneficia, and since what 
is good for one person is not necessarily good for another, this 
judge must be a personal arbiter, hence conscience. Nature has 
implanted within each one of us first of all a knowledge of what 
she orders, and then the conscious realization of the obligation 
of obeying these commands. We have an ingrained loathing for 
that which Nature has condemned, "infixa nobis eius rei aversatio 
~' quam natura damnavit."l7l This inward light of correct 
living sees and passes judgment on both what we have done and 
170. De Beneficiis, iii, x, 3. 
171. ~· xcvii, 16. 
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what we intend to do, noiroumspexit quaeque fecit quaeque fac-
turus est.u172 And this inward judge has the attribute of never 
-being deceived, "numquam fallitur.ul73 
The man who has drained the cup of iniquity, who has so 
imbibed of the poison of wickedness that sin is part of his very 
nature, 174 can have peace neither with himself nor with his 
fellow men. Conscience reveals him to himself and convicts him, 
ncoarguit illum conscientia et ipsum sibi ostendit.ul75 Good 
luck may free many from the punishment they have merited, but it 
spares no man the fear of retribution, ttmultos fortuna liberat 
poena, metu neiminem. u176 And while many crimes may of their 
nature evade the law (multa scelera legem effugiunt), none can 
flee the reproach of conscience. For it is the nature of guilt 
to be in fear, "proprium autem est nocentium trepidare.u177 Con-
stant fear, constant terror and distrust of one's own security 
follow inevitably the path of the wrong-doer. We must agree, 
says Seneca, that ttmala facinora conscientia flagellari et pluri-
~ illi tormentorum ~ !2, quod perpetua illam sollicitudo 
urget ~ verberat.n178 A man lashed by an evil conscience may 
seek and find a place of safety, but never peace of mind, "tutum 
172. De Clementia, xiii, 3. 
173. De Brevitate Vitae, x, 3. 
174. De Ira, 1, xv1, 2-4. 
175. ~· xcvii, 16. 
176. Ibid., xcvii, 15. 
177. Ibid., xcvii, 16. 
178. Ibid., xcvii, 15. 
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aligua ~ ••• praestat, nulla securum."l79 Asleep, he is trou-
~ed "inter somnos movetur"; 180 and in his waking hours he is 
more hateful to himself than he is to others, "invisior sibi quam 
181 
servientibus." He lives in terror of death, "saepe mortem 
-
timet", 182 but still he longs to be freed from the "conscientiae 
-
tormentas" and prays for death to come. 183 Such phrases, in-
deed, clearly bear witness to the tact that a pagan must have 
endured a type of living agony in pursuit of vice, and must have 
stilled the voice of conscience by the more horrible alternative 
of completely steeping himself in wickedness. The incomparable 
force with which Seneca depicts the operations of this internal 
custodian of Nature's laws, permits of the well-founded assump-
tion that in his life at the court of the Caesars, Seneca himself 
must have experienced these moral headaches time and again. 
As terrible as are the reproaches of conscience, so great 
are the joys of its approving nod. He does great things, main-
tains Seneca, who teaches how secure and tree is the blessing or 
a good conscience, "quam tutum gratuitumque bonum sit bona ~­
scientia.n184 If it is the fate of a wicked man to wish death 
that he might be freed from the internal stings of his soul, so 
179. ~· cv, 8. 
180. Ibid., cv, 8. 
181. De Clementia, xiii, 3. 
182. Ibid., xiii, 3. 
183. Ibid., xiii, 3. 
De Ira, i, xvi, 3-4. 
184. De Trinquillitate Animi, iii, 4. 
-
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bY the same token we must realize the value of peace of mind. It 
is preferable to even life itself, "~ potior !11 tamquam ~ 
185 ~·" . Whereas a bad conscience seeks to hide itself and 
suffers anxiety even in solitude, a good conscience gladly wel-
186 
comes the crowd, "bona conscientia turbam advocat.ff 
Death, as it actually approaches, presents a harrowing 
spectacle for those troubled with fear for their evil deeds. 
They endeavor to direct their thoughts away from their many ill-
spent hours, and their multiplied vices. If they review the 
past, at once the wickedness of their lives comes before them 
with its accompanying reproach. Only those can look back fear-
lessly whose acts have been subjected to the censorship of con-
science, "omnia acta aunt sub censura ~.n187 On the other 
hand, Seneca tells us that at death one can bear witness to him-
self that he has loved a good conscience and all good endeavor, 
Htestatus exibo bonam m! eonscientiam amasse bona studia.n188 
Then indeed such a man is following the path towards the gods, 
Had deos iter faciet.ff189 
185. De Beneticiis, i, xi, 4. 
186. ~- xliii, 5. 
187. De Brevitate Vitae, x, 3. 
188. De Vita Beata, xx, 5. 
189. Ibid., xx, 5. 
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CHAP!'ER VII 
VIRTUE AND THE SUMMUM BONUM OF SENECAN PHILOSOPHY 
Though he differs radically with Stoic thought on many as-
pects of the soul, Seneca is strictly in accord with orthodox 
teaching concerning the summum bonum of man. Preliminary to his 
discussion of right living, Seneca tells us that ffnunc veritatem 
••• guaerimusff, 190 that the two strong supports of the soul are 
trust in the truth and confidence, ff~!!! plurimum roboris 
animo dant, fides veri et fiducia."l9l Happiness is out of the 
question tor one who has been thrust outside the pale or truth, 
•extra veritatem proiectus.n192 In tine "unless I could attain 
19.3 the truth, it were not worth being born," he writes. 
"It takes the whole of life to learn how to live,n194 he 
says, and he pities the rabble which flows along in a sort of 
mechanical existence "nesciens vivere.nl95 In a number or 
beautiful phrases Seneca admonishes us to live life to the ful-
lest. It happens, he says, that often a man very old in years 
has no evidence to prove that he has lived long, save his wrin-
kles and gray hair. 196 Such a man has not lived long (vixit), 
190. De Otio, iii, 1. 
191. !E.· "XCC v' 46. 
192. De Vita Beata, v, 2. 
19.3. Naturales Quaestiones, praef. 
194. De Brevitate Vitae, vii, J. 
195. Ad Marc1am de Consolatione, x, 4. 
196. De Tranquiliitate Animi, iii, 8. 
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he has existed long (fuit); he has done not much voyaging (na-
vigavit), but much tossing about (iactatus ~).197 Consider 
-a man worth as much as his virtue; do not inquire how old he is, 
"incipe virtutibus illum ~ annis aestimare.n198 
-
Long life is 
not an essential for intrinsic worth, for just as a man of small 
stature may be a perfect man, so in a few years of life one may 
attain not the furthermost, but the most important goal.l99 For 
as Seneca mused in his own waning years, it another year were 
added to lite, "fuisset simile praeterito.n200 A full life is 
really a long life, regardless of how short a span ot years it 
may include. The thing to be striven for is not to live long 
but to live rightly. As a matter of tact, this is the only ele-
ment we have in our control; to live long one depends on Fate 
only; to live rightly, on his own sou1. 201 Perhaps it was with 
a sardonic smile that Seneca in his old age mused over the gross 
inconsistency between his own lofty ideals and his weak-kneed 
failure to live according to principle: "The point is not how 
long you live, but how nobly you live. And often this living 
nobly means that you cannot live long" (quam bene vivas refert 
J!2.!! guam diu; saepe autem in .!!Q.Q_ est bene, a! diu). 202 The 
197. 
198. 
199. 
200. 
201. 
202. 
~ Brevitate Vitae, vii, 10. 
~ Marciam de Consolatione, xxiv, 1. 
~. xciii, 8. 
1Ul· lxx, 12. 
~ Beneifciis, v, xvii, 2-7. 
1m,. :x:ci , 8. 
Ibid., xciii, 2. 
~· ci, 15. 
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life of a dissolute is really not life at all. Seneca tells us 
of Heraclitus who wept bitterly on seeing the wretched death 
203 (~O male pereuntium). And he quotes Curius Dentatus as 
"preferring to be a dead man than a live one dead; for the worst 
of all ills is to leave the number of the living before you die" 
(!!~mortuum quam vivere; ultimum malorum est ~ vivorum ,£!!-
. t . i ) 204 mero ex1re, an eguam mor1ar s • 
==----
Beginning the subject of living to the fullest, Seneca 
writes that life "nee bonum £!£ malum ~; boni !£. mali locus 
that it is neither a good nor an evil but a place where 
both good and evil exist, and it is up to each individual to set 
his own standards. He tells us, WWe must set before our eyes the 
goal of the supreme good, towards which we may strive, and to 
which all our acts and words may have reference--just as sailors 
must guide their course according to a certain star. Life with-
out ideals is erratic: as soon as an ideal is to be set up, doc-
trines begin to be necessary": 
Proponamus oportet finem summi boni, ad quem ni-
tamur, ad quem omne factum nostrum dictumque re-
spiciat; veluti navigantibus ad aliquod sidus 
derigendus est cursus. Vita sine proposito vaga 
est: quod si utique proposendum est, incipiunt 
necessaria esse decreta.2 b 
Then comes the "decreta". The epitome of Stoic perfection was 
203. ~ Ira, ii, 10, 5. 
204. De Tranguillitate An.imi, v, 5. 
205. ~· xcix, 12. 
206. ~· xcv, 45, 46. 
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•living according to nature," the preservation or harmony or 
soul, "concordia animi. 207 One who adhered to this principle in 
all the situations or lire possessed "virtus". The following are 
tb.e general definitions and qualifications of' a virtuous soul: 
•asperis blandisque quem~ adtollent ••• ordinatissimus ~ 
-
decore ••• sanus ••• inperturbatus, intrepidus ••• f'ortuita ~ depri-
-
such a soul is virtue itself', "talis animus virtus 
But Seneca does not mean to imply that a virtuous man 
is insensible to hardships, "~ sentit illa.n209 "Again and 
again, I must remind you," he writes, "that I am speaking not of' 
tb.e ideal wise man, but or the man who with all his imperfections 
desires to follow the perfect path (honestam viam), and yet has 
passions that are often reluctant to obey.n210 This man rises 
•calm and unmoved" (quietus placidusque) to meet whatever assails 
him. No proof' of' virtue is ever mild, "numquam virtutis molle 
211 documentum est." He counts the struggle entailed, as mere 
training, "omnia adversa exercitationes putat.n212 And if' one 
be lashed and torn by Fortune, he should look upon himself' not 
as the object of' the cruelty of' the Fates, but rather as engag-
207. De Benef'iciis, iv, 25, 1. 
De Otio, v, 1. 
De Vita Beata, viii, 6. 
208. ~· lxvi, 6. 
209. De Providentia, 1i, 2. 
210. De Benef'iciis, 1i, xvii1, 4. 
211. De Providentia, iv, 12. 
212. Ibid., 1i, 2. 
-
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ing in a struggle, "quod quo saepius adierimus, fortiores eri-
mus.n213 Disaster is virtue's opportunity, "calamitas virtutis 
-----~ccasio ~.n214 Another aspect of bearing up with life is its 
shortness of duration, "magno animo brevia feramus incommoda;"215 
tor we are no sooner engrossed in the struggle than death is upon 
us, "mortalitas aderit.n216 Such in summary are the divers 
descriptions of a virtuous man. Only such a man can be said to 
attain the "happy life" (~ ego ~ virtute nego beatam vitam 
~osse constare.n217 
Those are mistaken who claim the events of life are either 
good or evil. Rather it is the soul in its ability to rise supe-
rior to the vicissitudes of existence, that can turn these events 
into a happy or a miserable life: 
Errant enim, qui aut boni aliquid nobis aut malum 
iudicant tribuere Fortunam; ••• Valentior enim omni 
fortuna animus est et in utramque partem ipse res 
suas dycit beataeque ac miserae vitae sibi causa 
est.218 
It is the power of the soul to remain unconquerable; to stay a-
loof, as it were, "invicta vis animi,n219 amid earthly surround-
ings; to endure for the sake of tantum praemium--"~ advocabimus 
~atientiam, quos tantum praemium expectat, felicia animi immota 
213. ~ Providentia, iv, 12. 
214. Ibid., iv, 6. 
215. ~ Ira, i1i, 43, 5. 
216. Ibid., iii, 43, 5. 
217. De Beneficiis, iv, 2, J. 
218. !2· xcviii, 2. 
219. De Vita Beata, iv, 2. 
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"llit n 220 tranaul. as • 
-
The mind must experience no interruption of 
joy, "!!!.£. adtollens!:!.! um.guam nee depremens."221 This is the 
•vita beata" of the Stoics. Stated otherwise we have the "secu-
..;...;--
~a aspiciat"222 attitude of the soul in the midst of the great 
---
00mmotions of nature around it; the "~ idemque inter diver-
n223 definition of the immota cited above. This "vita beata" !! - ..;;;....;;...-..,;...;;.;. 
incidentally, is quite inclusive, graced as it is with "perpetua 
libertas; et nullius~ hominis ~ dei timor."224 
The virtue so well delineated, is the only immortal thing 
which falls to man's lot, "hoc ~ contingit immortale mortali-
b "225 us. ~ Some of the more concrete or practical aspects of vir-
tue are brought out when Seneca says that the virtuous man finds 
joy only in the present, and puts no trust whatever in the tu-
ture, in so much as whoever leans on uncertainties can bave no 
sure aupport. 226 We gather that the summum bonum he had been 
speaking of, is immortale because it is an abstract quantity, 
-
220. 
221 • 
222. 
22) • 
224. 
225. 
226. 
~ ~. iii 12, 6. Q! Tranqui litate Animi, ii, 4. 
.!E_. xli, 4. 
De Beneficiis, iv, 1, 2. 
De Constantia Sapientis, v, 5. 
IJe Vita Beata, iv, J. 
Ibid., viii, 2. 
De Constantia Sapientis, vi, J. 
Ibid., vi, J. 
.!E.· xvii, 6. 
JfE.. xcviii, 9. 
De Vita Beata, viii, 4. 
De Beneticiis, vii, ii, 4. 
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tberefore has no personality, and hence cannot be subject to 
When he uses phrases as "such a soul is virtue itselfn 
or nGod is virtue," he apparently means to attribute to the ani-
~us and deus the abstract qualities of goodness; and since the 
:;;;o.--
latter is just that, a quality, it has no material existence and 
bence is not subject to the laws of life and death. And in 
reverse order he seems to think of "virtus" as possessing the 
animate existence of that to which it has been attributed. The 
tact that he deems the virtuous intention as immortale, but the 
uous deed or the manifestation of this intention as des 
recognition than the mere passing sensation of having 
experienced pleasure--is brought out in his answer to Lucilius' 
question: "Interrogas, quid petam ~virtute? Ipsam. Nihil 
habet melius, ipsa pretium sui."227 Virtue itself is its 
reward. Moreover, the true joy of a good man (sapiens) come 
from within himself, "~ ~ ~ gaudium peteret,n228 for he has 
everything invested within himself, nomnia in~ reposuit.n229 
Virtue establishes a friendship between the gods and men, he 
, giving us to understand that there is some sort of rela-
our good deeds and the supernatural element. 23° 
Seneca says that "nulli non virtus et vivo et mortuo ret-
--- -
227. De Vita Beata, ix, 4. 
228. Ad He!Viam de Consolatione, v, 1. 
229. De Constantia Sapientis, v, 4. 
230. De Providentia, i, 5. 
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231 tulit gratiam," we can hardly assume that the "virtus mortua 
~
rettulit gratiam" has reference to heaven or remuneration in the 
-life hereafter for the good one has done here in mortal exist-
232 
ence. In view of his general attitude on the subject, 
seneca merely wants to indicate the good name one will leave be-
hind him, the reputation and example of having been a «vir sapi-
ens et virtuosus." 
--
Taking strong issue with the Epicureans who would have 
their summum bonum consist in well-satisfied appetites during a 
life interspersed with a good deal of otium, this champion of 
stoic rigidity severely criticizes their desire for pleasure. 
"Voluptas fragilis est, brevis ••• in qua nihil est magnificum aut 
suod naturam hominis ••• deceat.n233 He protests against the 
"virtus" by the Epicureans in connection with the idea of pleas-
ure. Virtue despises pleasure, treats it as an enemy, and re-
coils from it as far as it can. 234 We learn that the "pleasurefl 
(voluptas) means only bodily satisfactions, when Seneca says 
that all our happiness should not be placed "!!!. carnen, because 
"bona illa sunt ~ quae ratio dat.n235 He does say, however, 
truly but as if it were a rather sheepish admission, that ttwhat-
231. !£• lxxix, 18. 
232. Of. post, 93 f. 
233. De Beneficiis, vii, ii, 3. 
234. Ibid., iv, ii, 4. 
235. ~· lxxiv, 16. 
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ever fortune should send my way will turn o~t for the best, but 
I prefer that what befalls me should be the more pleasant and 
agreeable things, and those which will be less troublesome to 
236 manage." Which may indicate one of two things. It might 
mean, in the first place, that he was willing to accept both the 
good and the hard things of life and would make the best out of 
them, although it were just human nature to find it easier to 
accept the more enjoyable happenings. On the other hand it might 
illustrate that while all his teaching on how to live and be a 
happy man by the practice of natural virtue, was a good thing in 
itself, nevertheless, there were circumstances when it would be 
greatly to his advantage to act otherwise. From all indications, 
it was quite definitely the latter view that Seneca took when he 
preferred the "faciliora !£ iucundiora"; for he tells us quite 
bluntly, and more in accord with the spirit of Senecan than of 
the Stoic philosophy, that we should "observe and avoid long be-
fore it happens, anything that is likely to do us harm," (quod-
cumque laesurum est, multo ante quam accidat, speculare et a-
verte).237 
The opposite of virtue is evil. Having seen in what 
Seneca's virtue consisted, we might describe with considerable 
accuracy his ideas of evil. In dealing with the subject of evil, 
236. De Vita Beata, xxv, 5. 
237. ~.-xcYiii, 7. 
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however, he is quite brief and holds opinions which are in com-
plete accord with Scholastic philosophy. All vices, says Seneca, 
rebel against nature, they are a violation of the established 
order, "omnia vitia contra naturam pugnant, omnia debitum ordinEIIl 
238 deserunt," which is about as sage an expression as one will 
--
find among pagan moralists. He repeats the idea, but lends 
rorce to it by a contrast with the good order of virtue: "virtus 
vcundum naturam est, vitia inimica et infesta sunt.n239 .And 
while there is "consensus atque unitas" where virtue is present, 
"dissident vitia". 24° If man depends on his worst qualities to 
make him enjoy life, his will be a storm-tossed career full of 
uneasiness; 241 "such is the tyranny under which that man must 
live who surrenders to the bondage of any passion" {in tyrannide 
illi vivendum est in alicuius adfectus venienti servitutem). 242 
A sort of "particular examen" is advocated by Seneca for the 
correction of personal failings, "hoc mihi satis est, cotidie 
aliguid ~ vitiis meis demere et errores meos objurgare.n243 
While the idea is laudable, we venture to say it is not suggest-
ed as the result of Seneca's experience. The daily elimination 
of one fault is too optimistic a view of Seneca's will-power--
238. !£• cxxii, 5. 
239. !£· 1, 9. 
240. De Vita Beata, viii, 6. 
241. cr. post, p. 67. 
242. De Ira, i, x, 2. 
243. De Vita Beata, xvii, 3. 
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anybody's for that matter. 
At its best the virtue of Seneca consists in an attitude 
of haughty, proud superiority in receiving the various condi-
tions with which man's existence is frought. "Contemnite", is 
the mental attitude advised, whether we be confronted with 
ttdolorem", "paupertatem" or in general any type of "fortunan. 244 
The fear of death seems to be the only thing Seneca had diffi-
culty in conquering. But, he says, "once we have death in our 
own power, we are in the power of nothing" (~ sumus in ullius 
p_otestate, ~~in nostra potestate sit). 245 "Ferte for-
titer,"246 he tells us, and from being equal to the gods, 247 
you will even surpass them, "hoc est guo deum antecedatis.n248 
244. De Providentia, vi, 6-8. 
245. Ep. xci, 21. 
6-8. De Providentia, vi, 
246. Ibid., vi, 6-8. 
247. !E.· xli, 4. 
248. De Providentia, vi, 6. 
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CH.API'ER VIII 
SENECA LIVING LIFE IN VIEW OF DEATH 
Almost in Scriptural figure Seneca queries with reference 
to man: "Q,uid est homo?" He is but a vessel so frail that the 
slightest jar will break (quolibet quassu!!! et quolibet fragile 
iactatu). 249 Everything connected with human existence is 
-
short-lived and perishable, and is of its nature of temporary 
duration, (omnia humana brevia et caduca sunt et infiniti tem-
~oris nullam partem occupantia). 25° Seneca terms life the most 
precious thing in the world (~ pretiosissima), and condemns 
men for trifling with it and consuming it with frivolous pur-
suits. Often we fail to appreciate life as we should because it 
is an incorporeal thing, because sub oculos non venit, and for 
this reason "vilissima aestimatur, immo paene nullum eius pretium 
~."251 Life is short, but even this short time allotted to us 
rushes by with such speed that at the end but few find they have 
really lived. 252 Life is short, but we make it so; nor do we 
have any lack of it, but are wasteful of it. 253 "Vita brevis, 
etiam si dies noctesque bonae menti laboremus.n254 Even should 
we recall to mind the ages of men who have lived the longest and 
249. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xi, J. 
250. Ibid., xxi,~. 
251. De Brevitate Vitae, viii, 1. 
252. Ibid., i, 1. 
253. Ibid., i, 4. 
254. De Vita Beata, i, 2. 
--
in recalling them, desire such a lengthy existence, Seneca re-
~inds us in this reverie that, 
cum ad omne tempus dimiseris animum, nulla erit 
illa brevissimi longissimique aevi differentia, 
si inspecto quanto quis vi~~rit spatio compara-
veris quanto non vixerit.Zj} · 
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Just what does one look forward to when thinking of death? 
This is what Seneca queries; and in his cold, material search 
tor the answer, he opines that it is merely the final termina-
tion in a succession of events. The major portion of death has 
already passed, in so much as our past years are now in the hands 
of death. 256 Why should one's last hour be said to bring death, 
when in reality it merely completes the death process? It is not 
the last drop that empties the water-clock, but all that which 
previously has flowed out. True, we reach death at that last 
~oment, but we have been on the way a long time. 257 Death wears 
us away, but it does not whirl us away, ncarpit ~ illa, ~ 
corrinit.n258 His phrase, "~vita nihil aliud quam ad mortEm 
~ est,n259 sums up the journey aspect of life. 260 We have 
been placed on earth "ad brevissimum tempus," and should view our 
~tay as a sojourn at an inn. 261 "Tacita labetur": 262 thus our 
255. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxi, 3. 
256. ~- i, 2. --
257. ~· xxiv, 20, 21. 
258. ~- cxx, 18. 
259. Ad Polybium de Consolatione, xi, 1. 
260. ~· xcix, 7.--
261. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxi, 1. 
262. De Brevitate-vitae, viii, 5. 
Cf. Virgil, Georgics, iii, 66 Seq. 
61 
life will glide along. It will neither reverse nor check its 
00urse; nor will it remind one of its swiftness. The passing of 
our life-span will stop neither at the command of a king nor at 
the applause of the populace. As it started on the first day, so 
it will run along; nowhere will it turn aside, nowhere will it 
delay.263 
Another view Seneca would take of our life-span is that of 
a good which has been loaned us. The wise man, he tells us, 
lives as one who has been lent to himself and·who will return 
everything without sorrow when it is reclaimed. His possessions, 
even his personal faculties have been given him on sufferance.264 
our dear ones are granted to us not as permanent possessions but 
at loan. 265 Some of these blessings which adorn life's stage 
will be recalled on the first day, others on the second, while 
others we shall be permitted to use till the end. Everything is 
tor our use and enjoyment, but it must be r~embered that all is 
subject to change and return to nature. 266 
In describing death, Seneca becomes truly picturesque in 
many of his expressions. The general theme is well summed up in 
his Epistle referring to life as being a preparation for death. 
Though wanting in the supernatural element, the passage is in 
263. De Brevitate Vitae, viii, 5. 
264. De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 1. 
265. Ad Polybium de Consolatione, x, 4. 
266. Ad Marciam De Consolatione, x, 2. 
. substance thoroughly Christian. We quote: 
As the mother's womb holds us for ten months, 
making us ready, not for the womb itself, but for 
the existence into which we seem to be sent forth 
when at last we are fitted to draw breath and live 
in the open; just so, throughout the years extend-
ing between infancy and old age, we are making our-
selves ready for another birth. A different begin-
ning, a different condition awaits us. We cannot 
yet, except at rare intervals, endure the light of 
heaven; therefore, look forward without fearing to 
that appointed hour,--the last hour of the body but 
not of the soul. Survey everything that lies about 
you, as if it were luggage in a guest-chamber. You 
must travel on. Nature strips you as bare at your 
departure as at your entrance. You may take away 
no more than you brought in; what is more, you must 
throw away the major portion of that which you 
brought with you--that which has been your last 
protection; you will be stripped of the flesh, and 
lose the blood which is suffused and circulated 
through your body; you will be stripped of bones 
and sinews, t~g7framework of these transitory and feeble parts. 
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Therefore to live life in view of death, this is what 
seneca would admonish us to do. And while death is on the one 
hand the most certain of human destinies, 268 on the other hand 
nothing could be more uncertain as to its actual approach. He 
cautions us to profit by the .time granted us "sine dilatione", 
for no promise has been given of this night, "nay, even for this 
hour" (nihil de hodierna nocte promittitur--nimis magnam advo-
cationem dedi--, nihil de hac hora. Festinandum est, instatur a 
267. ~· cii, 23. 
268. !£. lxvi, 42-43. 
269 ~rgg_). Remorseless Fate has assigned a limit to the lives 
of us all, but none of us knows how near he is to this limit. 
seneca warns us concerning death that, "hodie fieri potest, 
~icguid umguam potest"; 27° whatever can happen at any time can 
happen today. It is easy to dispense an amount that is assign-
ed, no matter how small it is; 271 but since there is no fixed 
count of our years, our present life must be guarded more care-
fully since it may fail we know not when. 272 Hence let us so 
order our minds as if we had come to the very end, "sic itaque 
:f'ormemus animum, tamquam ad extrema ventum sit. Nihil differa-
~·"273 Daily, let us check our accounts, "cotidie .£!!!!!vita 
Baria faciamus"; 274 and let us so live that nothing that can 
happen shall be unexpected. 275 And if God should be pleased to 
add another day we shall welcome it with glad hearts. That man 
is happiest, and is secure in his own possession of himself, who 
can await the morrow without apprehension. When a man has said, 
"I have lived!", every morning he arises he receives a bonus: 
Crastinum si adiecerit deus, laeti recipiamus. 
269. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, x, 4. 
Ad Polfbium~e Consolatione, ix, 9. 
270. ~· lx1ii, 107 
271. De Brevitate Vitae, viii, 3. 
272. Ep. xxvi, 7. 
!E_. lxxiv, 3. 
273. !E_. ci, 7. 
274. Ibid., ci, 7. 
275. De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 6. 
Ille beatissimus est et securus sui possesor, qui 
crastinum sine sollicitudine expectat. Quisquis 
dixit "vixit," cotidie ad lucrum surgit.Z7o 
The wise man who has used his life to the fullest, who has not 
squandered any of it by neglect or wasteful living, will not 
hesitate to go to meet death with steady step. 277 
Seneca's ideas on the subject of life in view of death can 
perhaps best be illustrated by the description he gives of his 
own standards of living: 
I am endeavoring to live every day as if it 
were a complete life. I do not indeed snatch it 
up as if it were my last; I do regard it, however, 
as if it might even be my last. The present letter 
is written to you with this in mind--as if death 
were about to call me away in the very act of writ-
ing. I am ready to depart, and I shall enjoy life just because I am not over-anxious as to the future 
date of my departure.278 
276. ~· xii, 9. 
277. De Brevitate Vitae, xi, 2. 
278. Ep. lxi, 2. 
CHAPTER IX 
SENECA'S THOUGHTS ON DEATH 
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We have seen in detail the philosophy which governed the 
life of Seneca, his motivating ideals (theory and practice), his 
attitude towards the Source of life in the universe, and his re-
alization of the superior part of man's essence, the soul. A 
thorough understanding of these fundamental principles as influ-
encing Seneca is necessary, before it is possible to get an in-
timate view of his mind on the subject of death. If he recog-
nizes a God to Whom we are responsible for our deeds, doubtless 
he will also recognize some standard of morality, to the observ-
ance of which some definite sanction is attached. Should his 
God be totally indifferent to the material world, our deeds will 
be accountable only to ourselves for sanction. 
If Seneca's summum bonum is attained while man is in exis 
ence on earth, then death will mean little other than the cessa-
tion of this good and man's passing into oblivion. Pleasure, 
depending on his point of view, is what every philosopher sought. 
Entirely contingent on his theses concerning God, the existence 
of the soul, and its nature, did each of them formulate codes of 
virtue and catalogues of vice. A standard of life which sought 
none other than present physical well-being would naturally de-
lineate virtue as a purely convenient quality. Vice on the 
other hand, was said to be evil only in so far as it entailed 
suffering. Each, virtue and vice, would contain its own imme-
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diate reward or punishment. In fine it was necessary to investi-
gate and discover just what conscious relations Seneca had with 
the spiritual or immaterial world. This we have done; now we 
shall endeavor to describe his position on th& subjects of death, 
existence after death and immortality. 
Perhaps the strongest natural instinct in man is the love 
of his own life, his eagerness to continue in existence. To pro-
mote the realization of this craving, man has also been endowed 
with an innate urge to self-preservation. Only the gaining of a 
more valuable possession as proposed by the mind can influence 
man to disregard this natural law to insure his physical well-
being. That such a good may exist is distinctly implied in 
seneca's question pertaining to blessings greater than life: 
"Quid quod quaedam vitae beneficia sunt et maiora vita?«279 He 
says that as regards the libertas, pudicitia, and~ bona (a 
good conscience), we are indeed able to live without them, but 
that death becomes preferable, "sine quibus possumus quidem vi-
~' sed ut ~ potior sit."280 It is more honorable to meet 
death in the line of duty than by avoiding it to prove traitors 
to our cause: "~uanti viri est% ••• ~ praemia proditionis ingen-
~ ostendantur praemium fidei mortem concupiscere."281 But 
279. De Beneficiis, iii, x, ). 
280. Ibid., i, xi, 4. 
281. Ibid., iii, xxv, 1. 
l 
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the inherent worth of such goods can only be enhanced by the 
well-nigh supreme value that has been placed on them. It is, 
therefore, the universal testimony of mankind in all ages and all 
places that bears out this precept of the natural law that man 
endeavors to protect his life. And in proportion as man is im-
pelled to the desire of continued life, so is he stricken with 
that fear of all fears, the dread of ceasing to live--the fear 
of death. And since the urge to live is supplanted only by the 
recognition of a higher good, so the fear of death is alleviated 
solely by the appreciation one conceives for a greater benefit 
to be obtained in dying. 
In his accounts of the last moments of life and explana-
tions of the certainty of death with its accompanying uncertain 
elements, Seneca uses terms that are as keen in perception and 
beautiful in analysis as any others written in Latin. Few if 
any of the poets have as realistically described death as Seneca, 
and at the same time maintained his beauty of expression. Did 
he have the ideals of Christianity to permeate the purely natural 
outlook he takes, Seneca would, indeed, rank among the literary 
lights of the Christian Church. Many of his expressions bear a 
remarkable parallel to the words of Holy Scripture; but rather 
than indicate any Christian influence on Seneca, they serve but 
to illustrate how the Church applies the supernatural viewpoint 
to many of the natural events of life, how she merely directs 
them to their supernatural end. Seneca's discussions on death 
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include: a) living one's life in preparedness for death; b) man's 
natural love of existence; c) the fear of death and the efforts 
man would take to avoid this event; d) the certainty of death as 
alsO the uncertainty of its time and circumstances; e) the lack 
of discrimination death shows towards youth or age; f) whether 
death be a good or an evil; g) suicide; h) and continued exist-
ence after death. The subject will be studied in topics in the 
order mentioned. 
Throughout the writings of Seneca there is no other 
thought which more persistently recurs than the subject of death 
and life hereafter. The thought impresses the reader that re-
gardless of what matter Seneca may be dealing with, there inev-
itably creeps into the discussion death, as though it were the 
pervading element of the topic. Which fact illustrates the con-
tention that Seneca was a deep-thinking man who saw and realized 
long ahead of time the final mortality which awaits the things of 
earth. There is no one so ignorant as not to know we must some-
time die, he wrote, "~ tam imperitus est, ut nesciat quandoque 
moriendum." 282 This fact also brings out, in spite of his mul-
tiplied arguments to the contrary, that while the many disagree-
able situations of life could be forestalled or meliorated (even 
by the sacrifice of principles), and that while dread of conse-
quences for this or that action might be rationalized-away, still 
282. ~· lxxvii, 11. 
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that terrible, inexplainable, but positive fear of death seemed 
mockingly to triumph over all his philosophizing. 283 So defi-
nitely is this the case that Seneca tells us that once we have 
the rear of death in our power, we shall even surpass the 
gods. 284 And, therefore, save in the one instance we have 
quoted when a greater good than self-preservation is proposed to 
the mind, his one remedy for this fear is ffmortem contemnere."285 
Like a man frightened out or his senses going through an old 
mansion, he would reassure himself by shouting, laughing at the 
thing feared, in the attempt to deceive himself that it was by a 
nothing that he had been frightened, ffnosmet ipsi fallamus.ff286 
"I shall look upon death as a comedy with the same expression of 
countenance," says Seneca, in the attempt to conceal his actual 
fear. 287 Endeavoring to dismiss with a shrug of the shoulders 
the natural dread of death, Seneca says that death is after all 
an insignificant trifle over which men unduly trouble themselves, 
."minimum. est, de quo sollici tissime agi tur. ff 288 He says the 
fear of death is the bane of one's existence, the curse which 
lays a curse on everything else, ffmiserrimus ~ miserrima omnia 
283. De Beneficiis, v, xvii, 2-7. 
284. cr. ante, pp. 35, 55. 
!E.· xli, 4. 
De Providentia, vi, 6. 
285. ~· xxxvi, 8. 
286. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 1. 
287. De Vita Beata, xx, 3. 
288~ Ep. xciii, 12. 
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efficiens metus mortis.n289 
- In line with a more natural point of view he asks if there 
iS anyone who doesn't shrink from departure from life, 29° and 
replies to his own query in answering that "animos nostros 
offendat.n291 He shows a remarkable keenness of perception in 
-
analyzing the fear of dying experienced by a man stricken with 
disease. "Dread of death does not come from your disease," he 
writes, "that is a fear of nature" (hoc ~ dicam, !!2.!!, morbi 
hunc esse sed naturae metum). 292 With regard to those in old 
----
age, ill health, or other circumstances which would indicate the 
proximity of death, Seneca says that knowing in a more realistic 
manner that they must die, "nesciat quandoque moriendum,n293 
• they nevertheless turn to flight, tremble and lament, "tamen cum 
prope accessit, tergiversatur, tremit, plorat.n294 Indeed, 
when the mask is removed, the Stoic or Senecan mask of indiffer-
ence, it is found that everyone has this innate fear of death, 
"quemcumque vis occupa, adulescentem senem medium; invenies ~­
que timidum mortis, aegue inscium vitae.n295 In fact the very 
289. ~· ci, 10. 
290. De Beneficiis, v, xvii, 2. 
291. Ep. xxxvi, 8. 
292. ~· lxxviii, 6-7. 
293. ~· lxxvii, 11. 
294. Ibid., lxxvii, 11. 
De Brevitate Vitae, xi, 1. 
295. ~· xxii, 14. 
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rear of dying is often the psychological cause of men's deaths, 
"§.aepe enim causa moriendi est timide mori."296 This fear of 
death is the cause of the greatest discontent among men, "illa 
y::ro maxima ex omni mortalium populo turba miserorum, quam .!_!-
E.ectatio mortis exagitat undique inpendens."297 
Thus it is throughout the length and breadth of his com-
mentaries on death; the underlying reason for all his explana-
tions, admonitions and words of counsel is to remove this over-
shadowing fear of death. Seneca was superior to his age in so 
much as he did not live entirely for the present. True, he 
tells us to live in the present, for we can rely on nothing in 
the future; but far from revealing his own conviction in the 
matter, it illustrates how he is trying to explain away his own 
conception of the ultimate passing of all things. In so much as 
he could not forecast the future, its uncertainty held a sort of 
dread for him; hence, he more stringently disciplined himself to 
be indifferent to whatever might arise. In one frank statement, 
he implies the extent of this fear when says that a man in his 
hour of death requires tenacious courage of soul, and this only 
the wise man can manifest, "at illa, quae in propinquo est uti-
sue ventura, disiderant lentam animi firmitatem, quae est rarior 
296. De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 5. 
297~ ~· lxxiv, J. 
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]Otest nisi~ sapiente praestari."298 
The cause of this fear of death is rightfully recognized by 
seneca as being man's desire to live. At no time does he deny 
the natural clinging to life evidenced by the extreme measures 
one takes to preserve it. But since in nourishing this desire 
one must also face the realization and consequent fear of ap-
proaching death, Seneca would have us try to be indifferent 
towards life itself. Rather than have the pleasure of living 
th the dread of dying, he would sacrifice the former in the 
deavor to dismiss the latter. There is only one chain which 
binds us to life, he tells us, and that chain is the love we 
tor life; this chain may not be cast off, but it may be rubbed 
away, "~ est catena, quae B£! alligatos tenet, ~vitae, qui 
~ est abiciendus, ita minuendus est.n299 In almost Scho-
lastic phrasing we are told that nature has molded our souls so 
that they naturally love their own existence, "animos ••• quos in 
1:=~~ sui natura formavit,"300 and that all men tend to pre-
"sicut feruntur omnes ad conservation 
Seneca makes a graphic as well as accurate comparison 
he likens a man clinging to life to a person being carried 
298. ~· x:x::x, 8. 
~· l:x::xvii, 11. 
299. ~· :x::xvi, 10. 
300. !£• x:x::xvi, 9. 
301. Ibid., x:x::xvi, 9. 
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40wn a rushing stream trying to catch hold of the briars and 
snarp rocks as he is swept downward, "multi !!£ conplectuntur et 
tenen~, quomodo qui aqua torrente rapiuntur spinas et aspera.n3°2 
~ 
~veryone seems anxious to live long; then when people are well up 
in years, they try to stave off the thought of death by deceiving 
themselves that they are much younger, 
Vide quam cupiant diu vivere! Decrepiti 
senes paucorum annorum accessionem votis mendi-
cant; minores natu se ipsos esse fingunt; men-
dacio sibi blandiuntur et t~ libenter se fallunt 
quam si una fata decipiant.JU3 
~ death approaches, man greatly fears and endeavors to avoid 
it.304 And still, while so accurately testifying to man's nat-
~al desire to live, the many admonitions he gives us on how to 
~egard death are all for the purpose of overcoming this desire. 
Seneca would sacrifice the love of life that he might be somewhat 
treed of the fear of its loss. Such a procedure is hardly living 
"secundum naturam", but it does go towards making death less 
dreadful. Epistle CI, takes up the laments of Maecenas as he is 
on his death bed. The great patron had written that he would 
gladly suffer prolonged physical pain, were his death but post-
poned awhile. Seneca heaps scorn on this cringing prayer of 
~aecenas, saying after a bit of severe criticism, that Maecenas 
302. ~· iv, 5. 
303. De Brevitate Vitae, xi, 1. 
304. !£• lxxvii, 11. 
--
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seemed to think that in asking for continued suffering he were 
actually seeking a continuance of life, "optatur et tamquam ~ 
R!titur supplici ~.n305 
Granted that the love of life is natural, that the fear of 
death is natural, it must be remembered it was in Seneca's philo-
sophy to desire that which entailed the least suffering and in-
convenience. What, therefore, would be his attitude towards this 
tear of closing life, what would be his remedy for this situa-
tion? The attempt to rid oneself of the tear of death is two-
told in its nature. The first part consists in an attempt to 
deceive oneself as to the nature of death, laugh at it, scorn the 
idea that death can subdue man; and the second is an attempt to 
appeal to logic and cold reason that since death has been decreed 
for us, it should be accepted with Stoic gravity, with no more or 
less disturbance ot soul than any other event which comes our 
way. 
"Nam ~ illam bene rexit nisi qui contemserat.n3°6 
Thus sums up Seneca his own mental attitude toward death. He 
knew not what was beyond; he felt that there would be something 
to meet, but he was sure only of the past and of the present. 
Therefore, this Roman pragmatist would follow his own advice and 
305. ~· ci, 12. 
306. ~· cxi, 5. 
l 
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take care of everything in his power, lite and death. What lay 
beyond was out ot the sphere ot his eminently practical mind. 
tt~o mortem eodem voltu comoediamque videbo"307 would be his ex-
pression on his own death bed. He who tears death will never do 
anything worthy of a man. 308 "Contemne mortem,"309 he tells us 
and once you have overcome the fear of death there is no sorrow 
in lite, "Nihil triste est, ~ huius metum ettugimus."3lO 
The highlight of Stoic morality was the living according 
to nature, but as we have so often seen Seneca interprets Stoi-
cism to mean rather the recognition ot the laws ot nature in 
man's regard and the adapting oneself to these laws so as to 
bring about the least painful experiences. Senecan morality in 
no wise cautions us to observe the laws of nature for the sake of 
objective righteousness. We have seen that both in theory and 
practice he adapted principles to circumstances rather than make 
his standard of rectitude hold good regardless of circumstances. 
That Seneca was aware of the tact that there existed an ob-
jective standard of truth, and likewise that he tully realized 
the grave inconsistencies between his own lite and such a stand-
ard, is evidenced in his analysis of the mental attitude of a man 
307. De Vita Beata, xx, 3. 
308. De Tr'aiiquilli tate Animi, xi, 6. 
309. Ep. xxxvi, 8. 
~· lxxviii, 5. 
310. ~· lxxviii, 5-6. 
Bp. xci, 21. 
~· xxx, 3. 
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on his death bed. In such circumstances, one draws up his will 
as an "in~orruptum iudicem.n3ll Never do we wrestle more in 
making decisions than when with death staring us in the face; 
with all self-interest banished (remotis utilitatibus), only the 
ideal of good remains before our eyes (solum ante oculos honestum 
stetit). 312 We dispose of our material goods in a disinterested 
manner--perhaps for the first time--after seeking those most wor-
thy of inheriting our possession, "quaerimus dignissimos". For 
now what difference does it make to whom we give since no one 
will make us any return?, "quid enim interest, quibus demus ~ 
nullo recepturi?"3l3 Implied herein is Seneca's confession that 
his life was guided by such motives as the "utilitas", and the 
principle of acting for personal gain alone. These phrases like-
wise carry Seneca's implied condemnation of such a manner of 
life. 
On the subject of death, it has been noted that Seneca goes 
to great length endeavoring either to do away with the fear of 
death or to acquire the courage necessary to bear this affliction 
commendably. Recalling one of the general tenets of his system, 
we remember the word of advice he gave to Lucilius: "Observe and 
avoid long before it happens, anything that is likely to do you 
harm" ( quodcumque laesurum est, multo ante quam accidat s~eculare 
311. De Beneficiis, iv, xi, 5. 
312. Ibid., 1V, Xi, 4. 
313. Ibid., iv, xi, 4. 
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et averte). 314 
----
The inevitability of death preoccupied seneca 
all his life, much of which was spent in avoiding this very ob-
vious "quod laesurum est". Whatever may be said of Seneca's in-
consistency in his teachings, he must be given credit for facing 
the truth. If an- unpleasant condition arose, he surely endeav-
ored to get around it some way or another; but unlike the incred-
ulous of today, Seneca in hi.s saner moments refused to deny the 
existence of conditions such as they are. It is foolish to fear 
death, he says, since men simply must await what is sure. They 
should fear only what is uncertain, "~uam ideo timere dementia 
~' quia certa expectantur, dubia metuuntur.n3l5 Our minds 
must be ever in readiness, never fearing "id quod necesse est," 
but always ready for whatever may be (quod incertum est).316 
Seneca becomes truly poetic and certainly uses the clearest of 
logic in discussing the certainty of death. 
"Morti natus ~,n3l7 completely tells us what was in 
Seneca's mind concerning the end of man. This is the condition 
under which man comes into the world. Parents know this; and if 
with this knowledge they still bring forth children, they must be 
reconciled to the fact that they are the remote instruments of 
placing their offspring in the path of death.3lS For mortals 
314. 
315. 
316. 
317. 
318. 
~. xcviiii 7. 
~. xxx, 1 • 
AU Polybium de Consolatione, xi, 3. 
U9 Tran~uillitate Ariimi, i, 13. 
An Marc~am de Consolatione, xvii, 7. 
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can but beget their like: "Mortalis nata ~' mortales peperi-
sti.n319 Our death is proclaimed at our birth, "~ enim illi 
-denuntiata nascenti est,n320 and everyone who is privileged to 
-
be born is destined to die, "cui nasci contigit, mori restat.n321 
Whoever complains about the death of anyone, is merely complain-
ing that he was a man, "(flet) quisquis aliquem queritur mortuum 
esse, gueritur hominem fuisse."322 
----
For life has been granted us 
only on the condition that we must die. Therefore, he who would 
find fault with death, cannot wish to have lived, "vivere noluit, 
sui mori non vult,n323 since no one is able to be born without 
paying the penalty for being human, "nulli contigit impune ~-
ci."324 And, indeed, amid the turmoil of earthly pursuits, 
nothing is certain regarding man save the fact that he will die: 
"in tanta volutatione rerum humanarum nihil cuiquam nisi mors 
certum est.n325 
Some people think that in living longer this continuance of 
life enables them to avoid death. They look upon the death of a 
young person as being premature. There is strictly speaking no 
319. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xi, 1. 
320. Ibid., x, 5-.-
321. ~· xcix, 8. 
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such thing as a premature death, and no matter how a person lives 
ne cannot escape the inevitable lot of man. 326 Moreover death 
is no respecter of persons whether as pert~ins to age327 or sta-
tion in life. 328 Neither are we summoned according to our rat-
ing on the censor's list, "rum citamur ~ censu."329 
With keen insight into the psychology of the mind, Seneca 
tells those who are ill that "you will die not because you are 
ill, but because you are alive; even when you have been cured, 
the same end awaits you; when you have recovered, it will, not be 
death but ill health, that you have escaped" (morieris, ~ quia 
aegrotas, sed quia vivis. Ista te ~ et sanatum manet; ~ .£.2,£-
valueris, ~mortem, sed valetudinem effugies).330 Death has 
' 
its fixed rule equal and unavoidable, "aeguam et 1nvictam."33l 
Associating the supernatural element with the subject of 
death, Seneca would give the impression that the divinity, his 
Fata or Natura, has previous knowledge of the circumstances of 
the death of everyone, and has fixed the time limit of each one's 
326. ~· xciii, 12. 
Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xi, 5. 
Ep. xii, 6.-
327. !£• lxvi, 42. 
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span of life. To suppose that the duration of man's life were 
controlled merely by blind chance, that the death of the young, 
unexpected deaths and the like happened for no reason at all, was 
just too much for the faith which dwelt in the breast of Pagan 
seneca. His writings illustrate the fact that he felt someone 01 
something controlled the number of man's years. 
He quotes Demetrius when the latter addressed the gods, ~ 
immortales, vultis spiritum.? Q,uidni? Nullam. moram faoiam, quo 
nimis recipiatis quod dedistis.n332 In saying nFata nos du-
------
cunt," Seneca again attributes to the supernatural element the 
-
faculty of guiding the destinies of man, and he says that it was 
settled at the first hour of birth what length of time remains 
for each.333 Throughout our life, the Fates ply their work and 
keep us from being conscious that we are dying, so that death may 
steal upon us the more easily. As infancy changes into boyhood, 
boyhood into adolescence, followed by old age, death is always 
with us, lurking under the name of life.334 In coming into life 
we have entered "in regnum fortunae", and since she governs the 
length of our days, "durum atgue invictumn is her law.335 
Seneca consoles Polybius on the death of his brother saying that 
332. De Providentia, v, 5. 
333. Ibid., v, 7. 
Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xii, 4. 
334. Ibid., xxi, 6. 
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while "rerum natura illum tibi dedit,"336 still nature has made 
it clear that she exempts no one from her stern law, "natura 
nulli ~ necessitatis ~ gratiam facturam ~testata est.n337 
-
The termination of life is just where the remorseless law of 
rate has fixed it, "ubi illum inexorabilis fatorum necessitas 
fixit,n338 and all prayers and struggles, "vota ~ studia," 
spent in trying to avoid death, "frustra sunt."339 At birth 
the-time limit of each one's life is fixed, hence no one dies 
too soon since he lives only as long as he was destined to live; 
he has filled his capacity for living.340 Virgil's "Metasque 
~ pervenit ad aevi,n34l is the authority for Seneca's state-
ment. While he continuously dwells on the inevitability of 
death, throughout there is a tone of respect for the divinity as 
the master of the final disposition of man on earth. There is 
the intimation of an intelligent being directing man's destiny. 
In one place Seneca states that, "now is the time for you 
to reflect, not only that all things are mortal, but also that 
their mortality is subject to no fixed law.n342 And again: 
336. Ad Polybium de Consolations, x, 4. 
337. Ibid., xi, 1. 
338. ~· ci, 7. 
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«there is no fixed count of our years."343 These statements 
seem in direct variance with all we have been told concerning the 
nfiXUS terminus cuique," "~consilio," "naturae lege." In it-
self the inconsistency would fall right in line with the many 
discrepancies found in Senecan arguments, but unlike many others, 
this difficulty is readily explained. The "incerta lege" or 
Epistle UIII, is "incerta" only in so far as man is concerned. 
We live, not knowing when the last hour will come upon us. But 
the implied contention is that subjective ignorance on our part 
has nothing to do with the objective existence or a law governing 
the length or time each individual shall live. 
From a philosophical point of view the fact of death, the 
cessation or life, seems to have raised many questions in the 
mind or Seneca. ~ors quid est?"344 he asks, and shortly fol-
lows with his own answer. Death is either the end or a process 
of change, "aut finis aut transitus.n345 In any case Seneca 
rightfully judges that it is not a state or existence or a con-
dition: "Mors ad te venit; timenda erat, si tecum~ posset; 
sed necesse est aut~ perveniat aut transeat.n346 It occurs 
and has passed. Then there arises the obvious problem as with 
all things pertinent to the existence of man, is death a good or 
an evil? Seneca here presumes to convince us with the syllogism 
343. ~· xxvi, 7. 
344. ~· lxv, 24. 
345. Ibid., lxv, 24. 
346 • ~. i v' 3. 
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of zeno, the founder of' the Stoic school: "Nullum malum gloriosum. 
~; ~ autem gloriosa est; mors ergo BQn est malum.n347 Ex-
claims Seneca, "Prof'ecisti!"348 as he credits the master with 
the solution of' the problem. Far from assuring us even of' his 
own credence in such a groundless proof', Seneca gives us herein 
a note of' his own cowardice, an illustration of' his "let us de-
ceive ourselves" attitude seen earlier in this paper.349 As 
evidence of' his still doubting mind, we find many illustrations 
in his various works, the sole argument of' which is an attempt to 
show that death is no evil. Though his writings are replete with 
this negative type of' argument, we must look far before coming 
upon any reason at all for referring to death as "mora gloriosa." 
He terms death a blessing in so much as it releases us from our 
ills, "in malis optimum, supplicii f'inis"350 and he must even 
qualify this statement by saying those who do not view death as 
such are ignorant of' their own ills, "0 ignaros malorum suorum 
quibus ~ ~ ut optimum inventum naturae laudatur expectatur-
que.n351 And he repeats the same point later in saying that, 
"nihil mali mors attulit; omniua etiam malorum remisit patien-
tiam.n352 It is therefore only in view of' man's liberation from 
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the sufferings of life that death is to be looked upon as "glori-
0 sum". For Seneca adhered to the strict Stoic teaching, that as 
considered in itself and independent of the good it may procure 
tor man, "Mors .a!2. bonum nee malum est. n353 He explains this 
contention by saying that only "that which is something" (quod 
aliquid est) is able to be a good or an evil. 
The wise man, the Stoic wise man, must apply to death all 
the mental attitudes with which he views other disagreeable ne-
cessities. If he has acquired true virtue, Stoic virtue, he will 
tear neither death nor the gods, knowing "mortem malum~!!!!' 
deos malo n2B ~.n354 Just why death is no evil; well, it a-
lone is the privilege of mankind, "~ ius aecum generis ~-
ru:,.n355 Mere assertion proves nothing, hence it is concluded 
that the ffprivilegen aspect of death is merely its common aspect, 
and since what is in store for every man must come to each, death 
~hould be looked upon as a right. Somewhat in the same vein 
~ould be the argument that illness is common to mankind; hence~ 
~o bear it with patience one must cultivate the mental attitude 
~hat it is one of man's privileges. Seneca weakens somewhat in 
confessing, "mors inter !!!! est, quae mala quidem ~ ~~ ta-
~ habent mali speciem."356 He tails as he so often does, to 
353. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 4. 
354. !E.· lxxv, rr: 
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show just how death has merely the semblance of evil, when in 
itself it surely contains, by his own admission, all the dread, 
the fear, the dislike which are entities of evils he recognizes 
as such. In death, Seneca tells us, there is "nullum incommod-
~"; for there must exist something to which it is har.mful, "esse 
enim debet aliguid, cuius sit incommodum."357 The point made 
-
herein offers of several interpretations. If evil be considered 
as a condition or a state, such as ill health or poverty, then 
certainly "~ nullum habet incommodum," for death admittedly is 
no state, but merely the cessation of life in man. If on the 
other hand evil be viewed as anything from which human nature 
naturally rebels, then indeed, death may possibly be no evil, but 
not for the reason that it has no matter which it might affect. 
When Seneca holds that, "mala enim bonaque circa aliqu~ !!£-
santur materiam,n358 he exhibits rather shallow reasoning. For 
though man dies but once, the fear, the dread of this one event 
hangs like a pall over his entire life, serving as a controlling 
influence in many of the decisions he must make during that life. 
Again, if in stating "esse enim debet aliquid cuius sit incommod-
B!!!•" Seneca implies that death does not affect the body, he would 
maintain one of two views: either man is not living when death 
actually comes, and such an a·ssumption is preposterous; or he 
357. !E• xxxvi, 10. 
358. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 4. 
would hold that, with man still alive, the actual departure of 
the soul is no evil. All of which brings us back to the mere 
S6 
assertion, "~ergo~ est malum," without the semblance of 
proof or reason tor holding this position. Summing up his theo-
ries regarding the morality of death, Seneca admits he is at his 
wits' end and as much as confesses that his philosophical vaga-
ries were just that, vagaries. "Vides ipsam mortem~ malum 
esse nee bonum."359 
--
The goodness or badness of death is not in-
herent in the act of dying. Death may be termed good or evil de-
pending on the manner in which one dies and the reason tor dy-
ing;360 just as the morality of any indifferent act.takes on its 
aspect of sin or virtue in accordance with the circumstances and 
end proposed. "Cato illa honestissime ~ est, turpissime Bru-
tus,"36l he says as illustrating the point. 
In speaking of death, Seneca vouches several opinions on 
the subject of inflicting capital punishment. Readily does he 
admit of both its legality and in certain circumstances of its 
necessity. But his thoughts are permeated with an abundance of 
good judgment. "Ultima supplicia", he says are tor "sceleribus 
ultimis."362 And the "potestatem vitae necisque" should be 
prudently entrusted to a man who is calm in his decisions and 
359. ~· lxxxii, 
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emotion.363 The executioner holds a position 
which requires that he bring the utmost caution to his task, "ad 
rem summa diligentia tractandam."364 Death is rightfully in-
_.__ 
flicted on public offenders for two reasons. First this extreme 
penalty serves as a warning to other would-be criminals, "ut 
documentum omnium sit;"365 and secondly, the death sentence 
metes out justice to those who, unwilling to be useful while a-
live, by their death are of service to the state.366 Seneca 
would have even the condemned man himself look upon his sentence 
as of benefit to himself.367 
In the light of the teachings of Christianity under which 
we live, and imbued as we are with the philosophy of this school, 
we can view only with disgust the Stoic tenets advocating sui-
cide. Generally speaking, the Stoics were sufficiently clear in 
their analysis to follow through to its conclusion the various 
principles of their school. And in nearly all cases their doc-
trines degenerated into a system of expedience, varying in law 
and privilege according to prevailing circumstances. Now while 
their conduct on the whole followed such lines, there was one 
phase of the code that certainly was believed by all and adhered 
363. De Ira, i, xix, 8. 
364. Ibid., i, xix, 8. 
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to by most. They would spend a great part of life sacrificing 
ideals and stooping to the most immoral conduct with the one end 
in view, to avoid suffering and death. But strangely enough, 
when their last resources had been exhausted, when no hope re-
mained, when life had to be faced as it was, they calmly took 
their own lives. This being a convenient means of escape, the 
violence of its nature required more than ordinary rationaliza-
tion of one's mind regarding the benefits to be derived from sui-
cide. Seneca accordingly in many instances tries to convince 
himself that suicide is justifiable. 
He informs us that a study of Socrates will teach one how 
to die if it be necessary, but that application to the words of 
Zeno will enable one to die before it is necessary, "Socrates te 
docebit ~ si necesse erit, Zeno antequam necesse erit.n368 
Life with all its hardships is worth while only because death is 
always available, ttcaram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo.n369 
By one step, "~ gradu,n one may pass from the world or trial to 
that of freedom, nlicet ad libertatem transire.n370 During life 
it is the duty or a man to make himself agreeable to others; so 
Seneca believed, following the teachings of the Epicureans. But 
as to our death, one need please himself alone. The best type of 
368. ~· civ, 22. 
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death is the one we like: "Vitam et aliis adprobare quisque deb-
~' mortem sibi. Optima est, quae placet.n37l In accordance 
with these words, he says that just as one selects his ship for a 
~oyage, or a house when taking up his residence, so when he is 
ready, "eligam sic mortem exiturus e vita.n372 In the vicissi-
tudes of life, many people pray for death. "Demens" is the word 
by which Seneca designates them. For just as against their will 
it has been settled that all must some day die, so the time of 
death is in their own hands. The former is a necessity, but the 
latter is a privilege: "invita positum est, ut ~voles, in tua 
~anu est. Alterum tibi necesse ~' alterum licet.n373 He even 
goes further in saying that one often has the duty of destroying 
~imself, "saepe mori debemus.n374 In three instances,375 Seneca 
~akes the trouble to enumerate the various ways and means of com-
~itting suicide, pointing out the vital parts or the body. He 
offers the additional stimulus to the yet fearful, of exalting thE 
371. ~· lxx, 12-13. 
372. Ibid., lxx, 11. 
373. Ep. cxv~~, 22. 
374. !£. lxxvii, 10 • 
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courage required to take one's own life. 376 We are to under-
stand that nothing but our own will need postpone death: "Scias 
ad moriendum nihil aliud in mora esse quam velle."377 
--- ----
In this 
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feature of Senecan philosophy perhaps more than in any other in-
stance do we find a radical variance with the standard of his 
summum bonum. Senecan principle of rectitude and correct living 
is based on the "rerum natura." "Secundum naturam" is his slo-
gan. But in the matter of suicide, it is a fact born out by ex-
perience that this act is in complete rebellion to the propaga-
tion and nurturing of life as demanded by nature. Did Seneca not 
tell us that it is by instinct (instinctu voluntario} that all 
men tend to preserve their existence? "Sicut feruntur omnes ad 
conservationem sui.n378 But in upholding suicide, Seneca wrote 
that we must let every season and every place teach us how easy 
it is to renounce Nature379 and fling her gift back in her face, 
"~tempus, omnia .!.2.!. locus doceat quam facile sit renuntiare 
naturae et munus illi suum impingere.n380 This is Seneca's mor-
tal sin against his own conscience. Cato's suicide is eulogized 
with superlatives. "Consensus hominum fatebitur," declares 
~eneca. Cato reached the pinnacle of happiness (summam felicita-
376. ~· lxx, 21. 
De Providentia, vi, 7-9. 
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tem) when he clashed his will with nature's order that he con-
-
tinue living.381 The Scipios, the Catos, and other noted sui-
cides or the day were ter.med the ncoetus sacer ••• contemptores 
vitae.n382 
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If there is in Seneca any evidence at all that he had con-
tact with the doctrines of Christianity, it quite possibly could 
be indicated in the passage quoted hereafter. Similarity or ex-
pression on a given topic offers no proof whatever that Senecan 
teaching drew even in the slightest measure from the newly organ-
ized society of Christians. The force of this statement is born 
out in fact, since the spirit, the intention behind the teaching 
of each school was radically different. Only in a few material 
instances is a resemblance noted. But in the case presently re-
ferred to, we find distinct resemblance to Christian teaching on 
the endurance of evil and the unlawfulness or taking one's life 
merely to escape suffering. Seneca says: 
You will find men who have gone so far as to 
profess wisdom and yet maintain that one should not 
offer violence to one's own life, and hold it ac-
cursed for a man to be the means or his own destruc-
tion; we should wait, say they tor the end decreed 
by nature.383 , 
~e advances no proof whatever for the condemning implication that 
no wise man could reason thus~ Seneca merely intimates that in 
381. Ibid., iii, 14. 
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383. ~· lxx, 14. 
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following this line ot conduct, one is taking the more difficult 
path in lite--and incidentally the one more in accord with prin-
ciple. nHoc qui dicit, ~ videt ~ libertatis ~ cludere.n384 
This phrase gives us a concrete illustration of just what 
Seneca's "wise man" consisted. It serves as an ideal example of 
the fact that the "sapiens" first, last and always sought what 
was most convenient, convictions regardless. 
384. ~· lxx, 14. 
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CHAPTER X 
SENECA SPEAKS ON LIFE AFTER DEATH 
Seneca's belief in the rationality of the soul of man has 
heretofore been pointed out. The Stoic school whence he drew 
many of his basic elements of belief, took issue with the Epi-
cureans principally on the subject of virtus. The latter would 
describe the vir beatus as a man with well satisfied appetites. 
But the Stoics on the other hand held that the vita beata con-
sisted in a comfortable mind, a mind free from care, indifferent 
to the physical ills which beset mankind. Implied herein is the 
fact that in man there is a superior part, a something not mate-
rial which has it in its power to rise above the physical ele-
ments of life. Strangely enough little thought was spent on de-
termining the actual nature of the soul or its faculties. The in-
tense pragmatism of the Roman mind led the Stoic to live for the 
present only. What might come, what could possibly happen were 
too indefinite, too subject to the element of fortuna for his 
practical views. In general, the Stoic doctrine might be summed 
up in the expression, "live life as though at death you would 
face annihilation." The matter of existence after death, was en-
tirely up to the conjecture of the individual himself. Belief 
therein was a matter of choice. The fact itself was indefinite; 
life here and now was certain, and, hence, was the only sure gov-
erning feature of our conduct. It is at this point that Seneca 
differs widely from the parent school. He does, indeed, voice 
the general tenets of Stoicism, and in several instances gives 
evidence of the influence the Stoics exercised on him. But in 
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seneca there burned a pride in himself, a longing for the future 
that belied all his phrases to the contrary. In his words on the 
subject of life after death and immortality, Seneca reaches the 
heights of his literary career. These delays of mortal exist-
ence, he writes in one place, are a prelude to a longer and bet-
ter life, "per has mortalis aevi moras illi meliori vitae lons-
iorique proluditur."385 He likewise attains the heights of his 
religious creed, if we credit him with belief in the matters he 
states as merely possible. Had Seneca the light of revelation to 
guide him, and the depth of reason to arrive at the conclusion of 
the discussion he so correctly begins, his writings might well 
rank among the most elevated and orthodox ot the Christian 
School. As it is they resemble Christian teaching only in form; 
the soul is lacking. 
Life after death as treated by Seneca may be divided into 
two main headings: a) the fact and nature of future existence; 
b) and immortality. We shall study them under these headings in 
separate chapters. 
First is noted the Stoic influence on Seneca, in so much as 
he states, "mors est rum_ ~.n386 But this is the only passage 
385. !£· cii, 23. 
386. ~· liv, 4. 
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throughout his entire writings in which Seneca indicates that he 
ever dwelt seriously on annihilation after death. Even here, the 
exact meaning of the "~~"·is explained in the light of his 
own theory of what occurs after death. I know already what will 
happen, he assures us. What I was before I was born, the same 
will happen after my death. He tells Lucilius that we are mis-
taken in thinking that death only follows, when in reality it has 
both preceded us and will in turn follow us, "quicquid ante~ 
fuit mors est."387 _, __ _ Since death restores us to that peaceful 
state in which we lay before our birth, anyone who pities the 
dead must also pity those who have not yet been born.388 Our 
life is likened to a lamp, says Seneca, and foo~s are they who 
would believe the lamp worse off when it was extinguished than 
before it was lighted. And he asks, "reverti unde veneris quid 
grave est?"389 
A rare instance of consistency with his own philosophy may 
be noted in Seneca's remarks about the body of man. The greater 
part of his moral dissertations pertain to the good of the soul 
whether here on earth or in the world to come. The soul, we re-
call, is "ea pars quae melior est."390 As to our body, he as-
sures us that it is but "ossa cineresque."391 Our flesh is the 
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baser part of our essence, and not at all necessary for our ex-
istence. The matter of our bodies is no more a part of our ac-
tual self, than are the clothes and other protections we need for 
comfort.39Z Seneca opines that, after death, the soul never a-
gain has relationship with the body. This latter was just an 
instrument in this life, and at death it matters little what be-
comes of it. "As to burial," he assures us in the words of Theo-
dorus, "you are a fool if you think it makes any difference to me 
whether I rot above the ground or beneath it.n393 Concern over 
one's obsequies is a waste of time, "minus molestiarum habet 
funus tacitum!"394 
In an attempt to appeal to unbiased reason, Seneca gives us 
our choice in the matter of believing in future existence,395 
saying that in either case, life or annihilation, he would be 
prepared. "Mors ~ aut consum.it aut exuit. Emissis meliora 
restant onere detracto consumptis nihil restat.n396 After death 
the soul is either sent forth into a "meliorem vitam" or is min-
gled with nature again, and will return to the universe.397. 
And after a lengthy discussion on the happiness of heaven, he 
says, "but suppose that I am utterly annihilated, and that after 
392. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxv, 1. 
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death nothing mortal remains?" His answer is: "aegue magnum ani-
~ habeo, etiam si nusguam transiturus excedo.n398 But he does 
confess that the very idea of going nowhere after death is a re-
pulsive thought, an object of fear, nalius metus.n399 He tells 
polybius that his grief for his brother is uncalled for since one 
or the other of two views must be in accord with the actual fact: 
the deceased kinsman if living in spirit is happy, or he is not 
existing at all. nQ,uid itaque,n says Seneca, "eius desiderio 
~aceror, qui aut beatus aut nullus est? Beatum deflere invidia 
~, nullum dementia.n400 But this entire theory of the abso-
lute end of life at death is stated purely and simply as a possi-
bility that he is unable to prove away, while the mass of his 
~itings on the subject give all indication that Seneca enter-
tained more or less definite ideas about existence in the next 
rworld. 
As though in utter contradiction to all he had told us, 
Seneca reverses his position, saying, "Sursum illum (animum) 
vacant initia ~.n40l And, he continues, the soul will reach 
this goal even before hand by correct living and by the contem-
plation of its eternal destiny. One of the most beautiful of 
Senecan phrases in substance as well as in literary expression, 
is his comment, nthat day which you fear as being the end of all 
398. !E· xciii, 10. 
399. !E· lxxxii, 16. 
400. A4 Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 3. 
401. E.Jl. lxxix, 12. 
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things is your birthday in eternity" (dies iste, quem tamquam 
extremum reformidas, aeterni, natalis est). 402 And as such it 
may be taken as the key to the entire discussion of Seneca's be-
lief in the life after death. Se~king to find some relationship 
between the deeds of our present existence and the life which 
follows death, Seneca assures us that he has striven to find out, 
numquid stultum sit ac supervacuum ultra extremum 
diem curas transmittere, an cadant bona nostra 
nobiscum nihilque sit eius, qui nullus est, an ex 
eo quod, cum erit sensure non sumus, ante~uam sit, 
aliquis fructus percipi aut peti possit.4U3 
And his opinion would be that we do receive reward hereafter for 
virtue practiced: "Nulli non virtus et vivo et mortuo rettulit 
gratiam, si modo illam bona secutus est fide."404 But Seneca 
gives no indication whatever that this reward of virtue will come 
in the world of spirit after death, or that the soul after death 
will actually experience any degree of joy by reason of the deeds 
it performed when united to the body. The "sapiens" by a life 
spent in accord with the tenets of philosophy merits nclaritatem 
quae post mortem contingit."405 And though he is removed from 
the actual sight of men, his memory still recurs to their minds, 
"multa viri virtus animo multusque recursat.n4°6 The usual mo-
tive in undertaking notable projects, says Seneca is that poster-
402. ~· cii, 26. 
403. ~· cii, 4. 
404. ~· lxxix, 18. 
405. !E.· cii, ). 
406. Aeneid, iv, J. 
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itY will long remember our works. We continuously strive "~ 
(~} posteri taceant.n407 Hence our reward for the practice of 
virtue in this life and in the life hereafter, is correctly in-
terpreted as meaning the reputation we shall have earned while 
yet alive, and the renown that will fall to our lot after our 
death. We conclude by observing that Seneca at no time attempts 
to show any connectiom between the deeds of life and an account-
ing we might have to render for these actions in the life here-
after. He seemed to hold that man's actions are entirely a mat-
ter of his individual choice, bearing no relationship with the 
phases of man's existence. These latter were inevitable regard-
less of how man acted. 
We should expect that Seneca's conception of the future 
life would be in keeping with his fears and desires of the pre-
sent life. The strife, the turmoil, the constant peril of life, 
created in the storm-tossed breast of Seneca a longing for peace. 
Even when referring to death as being possible annihilation, the 
promise of escape from the present world of disorder offered its 
negative but nevertheless somewhat consoling aspect. Death is 
for all the end, he tells us, but for many ~t is a relief, "~ 
est, omnibus finis, multis remedium.n4°8 Telling Polybius that 
life is but a tempestuous and gale-tossed sea, whose one harbor 
407. De Tranquillitate Animi, i, 13. 
408. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xx, 1. 
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is death, he admonishes his friend not to mourn for his brother, 
for death did but make him free and safe, "!! itaque invideris 
fratri tuo; quiescit. Tandem liber, tandem tutus."409 Death is 
a release from all suffering, a boundary beyond which our ills 
cannot pass. A great and everlasting peace awaits the son of 
Marcia, "excepit illum magna et aeterna pax.n410 The "aeterna 
requies"4ll seems to hold sort of a spell over the turbulent 
soul of Seneca. 
Casting off the old forbidding Stoicism, with its fears and 
stern aspects of joy, Seneca launches forth in many places 
throughout his writings in praise of the joy and happiness he 
hopes will one day be meted out to him. His flights of fancy may 
in no wise be construed into a Christian significance, though in-
deed there are elements or the qualities of a glorified soul, the 
vision of God, the communion of saints, the science infused in-
to the souls of the elect, and so on, to be found in his analysis 
or heaven. He tells Marcia that there awaits after earth's dull 
motley the vision of all that is pure and bright, "manet !! ~­
fusis crassisque pura ~ liquida visentem.n412 A person who has 
died has not lost the light of day. On the contrary, "lucem sin-
ceriorem sortitus est.n413 Here below, our souls find little 
reason to rejoice in their lot, that is, the fact of their exist-
ence. But after death, freed from this darkness in which they 
409. Ad Pol~bium de Consolatione, ix, 7. 
410. ~ Mijr 1am de Consolat1one1 xix, 6. 411. Ibid., xxiv, 5. 412. Ioid., xxiv, 5. 
41'3. Ad Polvbium de Consolatione ix B 
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grope they shall have absorbed the full light of day and shall 
be restored to their place in the sky. Released from its prison 
below, the soul will cast off sin, and in purity and lightness 
will leap up into the celestial realms of spirit.414 Once we 
are set free from this place of shadows, heavenly light will 
shine down upon us from all sides, "lux undique clara percut-
iet."4l5 And from the "excelsiorum locatorumff it will be a 
pleasure for the souls to turn their gaze upon the things of 
earth, and to look back·on all they have left behind.416 
Bound, as it were, by the chains of mortal existence, the 
soul at death admits of no limits of time or space, except such 
as are binding even the gods. For the native land of the soul of 
man is the whole space that encircles the height and breadth of 
the firmanent, "hoc ~ convexum intra quod iacent maria~ 
terris, in quo disposita tot lumina in actus ~ excubant.n417 
Death liberates the soul and admits it into an existence having 
no boundaries, hence no servitude, "excessit terminos, intra quos 
servitur.u418 From this sunken region (~ humili atque depresso 
locum),4l9 the emancipated spirit delights in the boundless and 
open sky, "fruitur ~ aperto et libero caelo.ff420 
414. 
415. 
416. 
417. 
418. 
419. 
420. 
~. lxxix, 12. · 
Jm. cii 1 28. • J. 
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Ibid., ix, 8. 
It roams 
102 
throughout the expanses of the universe and ncum summa voluptate" 
explores all the delights of nature.421 Seneca would have us 
picture to ourselves the brightness of the combined light of all 
the stars. For us the whole expanse of the heavens will shine 
evenly. When in our perfect state we shall enjoy the perfect 
light, (~ totam lucem et totus aspexeris),422 then indeed we 
shall realize that our earthly life was lived in darkness. Here 
below, Seneca warns us, we can but hope to enjoy the light which 
now we see darkly with a vision that is cramped to the last de-
gree, "lucem ~ per angustissimas oculorum vias obscure intuer-
is.n423 
Another phase of the happiness of heaven is the associations 
we shall have in the company of the elect. He assures Marcia 
that her son and her father rejoice together in heaven, the one 
just arrived enjoying his new-found light, the other instructing 
his grandson in the secrets of nature.424 In several places, 
Seneca makes mention of our communion with the gods, as being one 
of the joys of heaven. "Patere mihi ad deos ~ iter judico. 
Merui quidem admitti et iam inter illos fui animumque illo ~ 
421. 
422. 
423. 
424. 
425. 
And he says that our better thoughts order us to 
Ad Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 8. 
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meet the god's approval, and to prepare ourselves to join them 
at some future time.426 For the soul says to itself, "When the 
day comes, I shall leave the body here where I found it, and 
shall of my own volition betake myself to the gods.n427 
Seneca promises us that in the life hereafter our knowledge 
of the secrets of nature will be complete. Some day the hidden 
laws of the universe will be revealed to us, "aliquando naturae 
tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo.n428 In the 
expanses of the universe, the soul explores the blessings of 
'f nature, "illic vagatur omnia que rerum naturae bona perspici t. n429 
Marcia's father initiates her young son in the wonders of the 
universe and he is qualified to do so having the information not 
by guess-work but, by experience, having true knowledge .of them 
all, "~ ~ coniectura sed omnium ex ~ peritus in arcana 
naturae libens ducit.n430 
Regarding the negative aspects of the joys of the life 
hereafter, Seneca enmaerates at length the many trials we shall 
escape when we become partakers of the blissful hereafter. En-
compassed, no doubt, with the worries and trials of this life, 
he often thought of a happiness consisting merely in the absence 
of each and every troublesome event with which this present life 
426. !£· cii, 29. 
427. !£· cii, 22. 
428. !£• cii, 28. 
429. Ad Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 8. 
430. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxv, 2. 
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is replete. There will be no fear of want, no "diviitiarum cura" 
which became quite a problem to Seneca in his later years. No 
stings of lust which through the pleasure they give the body 
destroy the integrity of the soul; no envy of another's prosper-
ity; no disaster to the land or to himself will he meet with in 
this future life.431 Life after death will, therefore, consist 
in the presence of what we like and the absence not only of suf-
fering, but of the desires of those things which cause us dis-
pleasure whether by the gratification of these desires or by 
their inhibition. 
Throughout his discussions on death and the life hereafter, 
Seneca at best has little of the supernatural element in view. 
His heaven is joyful only in so far as one could be joyful here 
below were the difficult things of life removed. There is not 
one definite place, for example, where he would indicate that his 
future happiness is awarded as the result of virtuous living. In 
fact he told us that his "virtus" contained its own reward.432 
There was nothing more in store for one who conquered his lower 
nature in this life, than the resulting convenience he would ex-
perience here and now. There was apparently no relationship'be-
tween the actual deeds of this life and the mode of future exist-
ence, and if we examine closely, the reason or explanation there-
431. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 5-6. 
432. De Vita Beata, ix, 4. 
Cf. ante, p. 52. 
105 
fore seems evident. Seneca in life, was true to no moral stand-
ard. At death he seems a disillusioned old man; an old man who 
had sacrificed every ideal he preached, for the comfort of the 
moment. He had only the fears of life as his real standard. 
His was more of a goal to be avoided than to be attained. His 
was an existence, pleasant not so much by the things he enjoyed 
but rather by the evils he escaped. Now did Seneca associate 
the hereafter, the one and only hope of true happiness left to 
him, with any type of pain or punishment, his last real hope 
would thereby have proved a vain expectation. The unreasonable-
ness of a joyful existence in the life after death for both the 
good and the wicked never seemed to occur to Seneca. ~uite 
likely he was willing to grant to everyone else, regardless of 
personal merit, the same felicity he hoped for himself. Such 
was Seneca, the mild-mannered, affable Seneca as men knew him. 
Thus it is that in dealing with the question of whether there be 
life after death or not, he offers us alternatives positive and 
negative. In the latter event there is no suffering, he says, 
since it is the same as not being. In the first hypothesis, and 
this is his personal choice of the two, it must necessarily fol-
low that since man continues to exist he must therefore necessa-
rily be in a happy state. There is no proof given or reason in-
dicated why such should be the case. Seneca merely asserts it 
as a fact. Epicurus had taught some sort of punishment due those 
who die after a wicked life. But, says Seneca, n~ ~ puer 
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est n433 as to believe all the stories of the "inferorum metus". _, 
He says that he is not so foolish, n~ ~ tam ineptusn434 as 
to give credence to the stories of the underworld, of Cerberus, 
Ixion and the spectral garbs.435 The whole business of fear and 
punishment makes up the stories of poets: 
Cogita nullis defunctum malis adfici, illa, 
quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulas 
esse, nullas imminere mortuis tenebras nee oar-
oerem nee flumina igne flagrantia nee oblivionem 
amnem nee tribunalia et reos et in illa libertate 
tam laxa ullos iterum tyrannos: luserunt ista 
poetae et vanis nos agitavere terroribus. Mors 
dolorum omnium exsolutio est et finis, ultra quem 
mala nostra exeunt.436 
But still Seneca speaks of the dying as ntimentes ~ apud inferos 
sirit"437 and definitely implies that one must needs argue with 
himself and endeavor to convince oneself that the underworld is 
actually a compilation of fiction, "persuaseris istas fabulas 
And again he does tell Marcia that following the 
death of her father, his soul "tarried above us while he was be-
ing purified and was ridding himself of all the blemishes and 
stain that still clung to him from his mortal existenoe.n439 
433. ~· xxiv, 18. 
434. Ibid., xxiv, 18. 
435. ~· xxiv, 18. 
!P_. lxxxii, 16. 
Cf. Juvenal, Sat. ii, 149. 
436. Ad Maroiam de Consolatione, xix, 4. 
437. ~· lxxxii, 16. 
438. ~· lxxxii, 16. 
439. Ad Maroiam de Consolatione, xxv, 1. 
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type of unhappiness in the life after death, and he is quick to 
apply here the "nosmet ipsi fallamusn440 cure for all uneasiness 
and fear. 
440. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 2. 
Cf. Pp • 67, BO. 
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CHAPI'ER XI 
SENECAN VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY 
With reference to Seneca's views on immortality, it is suf-
ficient to have established his position regarding the life after 
death. The expression "sufficient" is used purposely because in 
every passage wherein he speaks of the happiness of the life 
hereafter, he invariably qualifies it with the note that its fe-
licity is everlasting. In the metaphysical searchings of Seneca, 
the immortality of the soul is perhaps the one element which is 
most devoid of argument or question--it is taken for gr~nted. It 
is the "~ gratissima"441 of his letter to Lucilius. And for 
the Stoics and Seneca in particular, it was sufficient that a 
matter be "gratissimaff for it to be proved beyond a doubt. At 
no time does he offer to dispute as to the fact of life after 
death being eternal in duration. But as evidence that there was 
a discussion among the ancients regarding the immortality of the 
soul, Seneca quotes the example of Canus who, as he was being led 
to execution, remarked, "You are wondering whether our souls are 
immortal, but I shall soon know.n442 And Seneca praises him in 
his search for the truth even when confronted with the fact of 
his own death, "~ desiit veritatem in ipso fine.u443 Seneca 
himself would begin the discussion on the future life by admit-
441. ~. cii, 2. 
442. De Tranquillitate Animi, xiv, 8. 
443. Ibid., xiv, 8. 
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ting the possibility of its non-existence. But after aerely pre-
senting such an alternative to our credence, he proceeds at great 
length to show his personal belief in continued life of the soul 
after death. And once this fact is established, the eternal du-
ration of the future life goes along with the life as if a natu-
ral element of it. For Seneca, just as the ~act of li~e after 
death implies that it could be only a happy life, so also by the 
same token, this life must also be eternal. He tells us that, 
"I was taking pleasure in investigating the immortality of souls, 
nay in believing that doctrine ••• and ~eeling that I was destined 
to pass over into that in~inity o~ t~e and the heritage of eter-
nity" (in ~ensum illud tempus et !£possessionem omnis aevi 
transiturus).444 
In the hurry and rush of life, man ~requently becomes so 
much a part of the passing elements among which he lives, that, 
says Seneca, seldom does he li~t his mind to consider things o~ 
eternal importance. "Man is too mortal to comprehend things im-
mortal" (tamen homo ad immortalium cogitationem nimis mortalis 
est).445 But he admits the fact that all men are imbued with 
the innate desire of immortality. He tells us that while we have 
all the fears of mortals, "omnia tamquam immortales concupisci-
444. ~· cii, 2. 
445. De Otio, v, 7. 
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tis."446 And he says of mankind·in general that we plan for the 
things of eternity.447 
~uite obviously mortal man cannot attain his immortal sta-
tus here below in this life. It is, therefore, but taken for 
granted that all immortality spoken of by Seneca refers to exist-
ence after death. He assures Marcia that not her son, but only 
his very imperfect likeness has perished. For the boy himself is 
eternal and in death has reached a far better state, stripped of 
all outward encumbrances and left simply to himself, "ipse quidem 
aeternus meliorisque ~ status est, despoliatus oneribus alien-
is et sibi relictus."448 A person in life, considered in his 
soul, is actually immortal, but he does not take on the evidence 
of immortality until his death. After death "aeternus est."449 
One of the joys of a soul reaching its destiny after its separa-
tion from the body, is the knowledge that its felicity will en-
dure forever. In the light of this knowledge, it proceeds to the 
enjoyment of all that has been or will be throughout the ages of 
all time, "aeternitatis ~ memor in ~ quod fuit futurumque 
est vadit omnibus saeculis."450 
The fact of immortality is but an attribute of the main 
446. De Brevitate Vitae, iii, 4. 
447. ~· C1, 1. 
448. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxiv, 5. 
449. Ad Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 7. 
450. Ad Helviam de Consolatione, xx, 2. 
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feature, the existence of life after death. As such, it is in-
dependent of its subject, regardless of the nature of this life. 
But we have seen, that in Seneca's order of things, there is but 
the one mode of existence after death. Happiness is the lot of 
man in the next world, and eternal is his joy: "Felices animae 
animae et aeterna sortitae.n45l 
451. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxvi, 6. 
CHAPTER XII 
SUMN.ARY AND CONCLUSION 
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It has been our endeavor in this thesis to collect from the 
many writings of Seneca, those expressions of moral and philo-
sophic thought, the summation of which might be termed nsenecan 
Philosophy.n For several reasons this was not an easy task. 
First, throughout the course of Seneca's works many contradic-
tions occur, a fact that often prohibits the drawing of definite 
conclusions as to which of several opposing courses Seneca ad-
heres. Secondly, and somewhat following from the above-mentioned 
point, the statements of Seneca almost invariably need analysis 
and interpretation. The contradictory elements and ambiguous 
terminology on occasion give rise to a number of possible mean-
ings, and it is our conclusion that Seneca himself was often at a 
loss as to just what he intended to say. In looking into the 
man's life for confirmation of some principle or another, we were 
further confused, in that the philosopher Seneca was a much dif-
ferent man than Seneca the statesman. With regard to this latter 
point, his inconsistency led Fabius to remark that had his judg-
ment and action been answerable to his wit, it had been much more 
for Seneca's reputation. 
~uintilian describes Seneca as a shallow thinker,'"in 
philosophia parum diligens.n452 This expression adequately 
452. Institutiones Oratoriae, x, i, 125. 
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states the depth or lack of depth of Senecan thought. His weak-
ness was his love for compromise, in action and in teaching. 
Personally, he seemed convinced of nothing. His was a type of 
negative existence, the living of life to avoid pain. In some 
few instances, he attempts to justify by his writings this ser-
vility to changing circumstances; in most cases, however, he 
states what he thinks should be done, with a bland disregard of 
his own condemning actions. 
He prided himself on being a pupil of the Stoic school, 
which taught a system of rigorous self-discipline that trained 
its adherents to cope with any of the vicissitudes of life. 
Stoicism was afraid of life and of emotions because they hurt, 
and it was to this school that Seneca allied himself. But the 
strict following of these precepts was too much for his vacil-
lating and negative will. He was a bold, inconsistent moralist 
preaching rather than exemplifying Stoic virtue. Thus it is, 
that Seneca's life, his writings, and often his thoughts formed 
three divergent streams in all of which Seneca found himself to 
his own consternation. 
The writings of Seneca at their best, show no evidence of 
having been inspired by the teachings of Christianity. He, like 
other Romans of the day, could not help having learned about the 
new Religion, but he made no distinction between the Christians 
and the J"ews, whom he termed "gens sceleratissima."453 Seneca's 
453. Quoted by St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei,Lib.vi,Cap.ii. 
r 
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brother, Gallio, refused to hear St. Paul speak in his own be-
half, and with this refusal there passed forever the opportunity 
for influence of the great Apostle on this gifted but haughty 
Roman family. Seneca's conceptions of rectitude, death and the 
future life must be viewed as literary speculations, rather than 
as his·religious beliefs. And any resemblance which Senecan mo-
rality holds to Christian Doctrine is purely material in sub-
stance. Moreover, we hasten to add that, contrary to the prac-
tice observed in a number of commentaries on Senecan morality, 
one cannot isolate phrases of Senecan teaching and correctly 
understand them. His philosophical opinions offer of accurate 
interpretation only when associated with their respective con-
texts. In t~e course of this. paper, all citations from the works 
of Seneca have been interpreted in this light. 
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